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The Development of Religious Liberty in Chile,
1973-2000
I. INTRODUCTION
“The principle of religious liberty,” scholar James E. Wood, Jr.,
observed, “may well lay claim to being the foundation of all civil liberties and a democratic state.”1 In addition to “legitimat[ing] an indeterminate plurality of religions,”2 freedom of religion affirms and
espouses “the sanctity or intrinsic worth ascribed to the human person,”3 a principle that forms “the basis of all human freedom[s]”4
necessary for the establishment and preservation of an open and democratic society.5 According to religious freedom’s proponents, it is
precisely this “final grounding in the nature and sacredness of the
human person”6 that makes religious freedom “the condition and
guardian of all true freedom.”7
Given that freedom of religion is widely considered a basic human right or civil liberty—if not “the cornerstone of all other civil
liberties and all human rights”8—it remains both puzzling and alarming that Western society, supposedly the world’s most active champion of democracy and human rights, has developed the “habit of
ignoring religious persecution”9 and religious human rights in gen1. James E. Wood, Jr., The Relationship of Religious Liberty to Civil Liberty and a Democratic State, 1998 BYU L. REV. 479, 479.
2. FRANKLIN I. GAMWELL, THE MEANING OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: MODERN
POLITICS AND THE DEMOCRATIC RESOLUTION 153 (1995).
3. Wood, supra note 1, at 488.
4. Id.
5. See id. at 488 (quoting Henry David Thoreau, Essay on Civil Disobedience, in 4 THE
WRITINGS OF HENRY DAVID THOREAU 356, 387 (1906) (“There will never be a really free
and enlightened State until the State comes to recognize the individual as a higher and independent power, from which its own power and authority are derived, and treats him accordingly.”)).
6. Id. at 489.
7. Id. at 490 (quoting Statement on Religious Liberty, in MINUTES AND REPORTS,
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES 15 (1949)).
8. Id. at 489.
9. Paul Marshall, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Freedom, and International Affairs, Address at the Hillsdale College Center for Constructive Alternatives Seminar (Fall 1998), in
IMPRIMIS, Mar. 1999, at 1, 1.
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eral.10 Recently, Paul Marshall, a senior fellow at Freedom House’s
Center for Religious Freedom in Washington, D.C., related the following account illustrating the extent of the prevailing neglect of religious freedom matters:
At the end of 1997, former New York Times executive editor A.M.
Rosenthal confessed, “I realized that in decades of reporting, writing, or assigning stories on human rights, I rarely touched on one
of the most important. Political human rights, legal, civil, and press
rights, emphatically often; but the right to worship where and how
God or conscience leads, almost never.”11

Tragically, Marshall concluded, this type of inattentiveness to, if
not disregard for, religious freedom and religious human rights “is
all too common in the West.”12
The neglect of religious persecution and human rights mentioned by Marshall forms a prevalent theme in scholars’ examination
of human rights developments in Chile since 1973. Numerous works
painstakingly examine General Augusto Pinochet’s authoritarian regime’s violation of political, legal, civil, and press rights13 or the unfolding of human rights issues following the re-establishment of democratic government in 1990.14 Such works, however, treat religious

10. See W. Cole Durham, Jr., Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative Framework, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 1
(Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996).
11. Marshall, supra note 9, at 1.
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., CYNTHIA BROWN, CHILE SINCE THE COUP: TEN YEARS OF REPRESSION
(1983); 1-2 CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION, REPORT
OF THE CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION (Phillip E.
Berryman trans., 1993) [hereinafter NATIONAL COMMISSION]; REGGIO EMILIA, VIOLACIÓN
POR PARTE DE LA JUNTA MILITAR DE LOS PRINCIPIOS ESTABLECIDOS EN LA DECLARACIÓN
UNIVERSAL DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS EN EL TERRENO DE LA JUVENTUD (1975);
COMISIÓN INTERNACIONAL INVESTIGADORA DE LOS CRÍMENES DE LA JUNTA MILITAR EN
CHILE, LOS CRÍMENES FASCISTAS DE LA JUNTA MILITAR CHILENA: INFORME DE LA COMISIÓN
INTERNACIONAL INVESTIGADORA DE LOS CRÍMENES DE LA JUNTA MILITAR EN CHILE
(1976); MARY HELEN SPOONER, SOLDIERS IN A NARROW LAND: THE PINOCHET REGIME IN
CHILE (1994); F. Van Hoof, The Protection of Human Rights and the Impact of Emergency
Situations under International Law with Special Reference to the Present Situation in Chile, 10
DROITS DE L’HOMME 213 (1979).
14. See, e.g., CYNTHIA BROWN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE “POLITICS OF
AGREEMENTS”: CHILE DURING PRESIDENT AYLWIN’S FIRST YEAR (1991); COMISIÓN
CHILENA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, BALANCE DE LA SITUACIÓN DE DERECHOS HUMANOS
DURANTE 1990 (1991); LUIS RONIGER & MARIO SZNAJDER, THE LEGACY OF HUMANRIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN CONE: ARGENTINA, CHILE, AND URUGUAY (1999);
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liberty concerns superficially at best. Discussions of “religious” issues
almost exclusively address the Chilean government’s violation of the
political, legal, and press rights of those religious organizations that
opposed the government’s authoritarian policies and practices15 or
theorize about the socio-political role that religious organizations
might play in the future of Chilean democracy.16 Though such issues
constitute a legitimate and important area of study, the present trend
ELIN SKAAR, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND THE PARADOX OF DEMOCRATIC
TRANSITION: A STUDY OF CHILE AND ARGENTINA (1994).
15. See, e.g., MICHAEL FLEET & BRIAN H. SMITH, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND
DEMOCRACY IN CHILE AND PERU 59-75, 111-58 (1997); ANOTHONY GILL, RENDERING
UNTO CAESAR: THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE STATE IN LATIN AMERICA 121-48 (1998);
LA IGLESIA Y LA JUNTA MILITAR DE CHILE (DOCUMENTOS) 53-74 (1975) [hereinafter LA
IGLESIA Y LA JUNTA MILITAR]; JEFFREY KLAIBER, IGLESIA, DICTADURAS Y DEMOCRACÍA EN
AMÉRICA LATINA 88-100 (1997); BRIAN LOVEMAN, CHILE: THE LEGACY OF HISPANIC
CAPITALISM 315-317 (2d ed. 1988); PAMELA LOWDEN, MORAL OPPOSITION TO
AUTHORITARIAN RULE IN CHILE, 1973-90 (1996); ORLANDO MELLA, RELIGION AND
POLITICS IN CHILE: AN ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS MODELS 35-44 (1987); BRIAN H. SMITH,
THE CHURCH AND POLITICS IN CHILE: CHALLENGES TO MODERN CATHOLICISM 283-355
(1982); EUGENIO YAÑEZ, LA IGLESIA CHILENA Y EL GOBIERNO MILITAR: ITINERARIO DE
UNA DIFÍCIL RELACIÓN (1973-1988) 51-132 (1989); Carolyn Cook Dipboye, The Roman
Catholic Church and the Political Struggle for Human Rights in Latin America, 1968-1980, in
24 J. CHURCH & STATE 497 (1982); Michael Fleet, The Chilean Church and the Transition to
Democracy, in ORGANIZED RELIGION IN THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF LATIN
AMERICA 41, 65-95 (Satya R. Pattnayak ed., 1994); Brian Loveman, Antipolitics in Chile,
1973-94, in THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOLITICS: THE MILITARY IN LATIN AMERICA 268, 274276 (Brian Loveman & Thomas M. Davies, Jr. eds., 1997) [hereinafter POLITICS OF
ANTIPOLITICS]; Martín Poblete, Chile from the Patronato to Pinochet, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
AND EVANGELIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA: THE CHALLENGE OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM 220,
220-34 (Paul E. Sigmund ed., 1999) [hereinafter RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND
EVANGELIZATION]; Brian H. Smith, The Catholic Church and Politics in Chile, in CHURCH
AND POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 321, 321-43 (Dermot Keogh ed., 1990) [hereinafter Smith,
Catholic Church]; Brian H. Smith, Chile: Deepening the Allegiance of Working-Class Sectors to
the Church in the 1970s, in RELIGION AND POLITICAL CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA 156,
156-86 (Daniel H. Levine ed., 1986) [hereinafter Smith, Chile]; Brian H. Smith, Churches and
Human Rights in Latin America: Recent Trends on the Subcontinent, in CHURCHES AND
POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 155, 155-162 (Daniel H. Levine ed., 1980); Hannah StewartGambino, Redefining the Changes and Politics in Chile, in CONFLICT AND COMPETITION:
THE LATIN AMERICAN CHURCH IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 21, 21-44 (Edward L.
Cleary & Hannah Stewart-Gambino eds., 1992); cf. WILLIAM T. CAVANAUGH, TORTURE AND
EUCHARIST: THEOLOGY, POLITICS, AND THE BODY OF CHRIST (1998) (discussing the Pinochet government’s oppression of the Catholic Church in the context of torture, ecclesiology,
and Eucharist).
16. See, e.g., VIRGINIA MARIE BOUVIER, ALLIANCE OR COMPLIANCE: IMPLICATIONS
OF THE CHILEAN EXPERIENCE FOR THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN LATIN AMERICA (1983);
FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 159-94; MARÍA ANTONIETA HUERTA & LUIS PACHECO
PASTENE, LA IGLESIA CHILENA Y LOS CAMBIOS SOCIOPOLÍTICOS 293-343 (1988); StewartGambino, supra note 15, at 33-41.
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leaves larger religious freedom questions and interests essentially unexplored.
The topic of religious freedom in Chile from 1973 to the present
warrants serious scholarly attention for several significant reasons.
For example, as previously discussed, the principle of religious liberty
arguably “is integrally related to all other civil liberties and to the
maintenance of a free and democratic state.”17 Accordingly, the evolution of Chilean democracy between 1973 and the present can be
fully understood only upon considering Chile’s treatment of religious freedom issues. Similarly, a comprehensive understanding of
Chilean political, legal, and human rights developments during this
period depends upon the consideration of all relevant factors, including religion and religious liberty.18 Lastly, the topic provides valuable
case study information regarding the treatment of religious freedom
issues by the ideologically similar military regimes that emerged in
South America during the 1960s and 1970s;19 the treatment of religious freedom issues by governments ruling through emergency
powers; and the carry-over of civil rights policies and practices from
authoritarian military regimes to successor forms of government, especially the “protected democracy.”20
In light of these potential benefits, this Comment explores the
evolution of religious liberty in Chile between 1973 and the present.
To provide an adequate historical background against which to understand post-1973 developments relating to religious freedom, Part
II briefly summarizes the evolution of religious liberty in Chile prior
to 1973. Part III examines and compares the manner in which religious liberty has evolved under the Pinochet regime and the elected
governments that have succeeded it, focusing on three particular factors: the development of Chile’s national juridical framework, the national government’s perception and treatment of religious groups
and organizations, and the public’s perception and treatment of reli-

17. Wood, supra note 1, at 488.
18. Cf. Marshall, supra note 9, at 5-6 (arguing that “[a]nalyses [of any political order]
that ignore religion should be inherently suspect”).
19. Between the mid-1960s and late 1970s, ideologically similar military regimes
emerged in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay. For a discussion on their views, similarities, and differences, see generally POLITICS OF ANTIPOLITICS, supra note 15, at 158-364.
20. BRIAN LOVEMAN, FOR LA PATRIA: POLITICS AND THE ARMED FORCES IN LATIN
AMERICA 213 (1999). For a discussion of “protected democracy” in Chile, see infra notes 7172, 190 and accompanying text.
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gious groups and organizations. A close examination of these factors
reveals three significant characteristics of the post-1973 development
and status of religious liberty in Chile: (1) the national security policies and concerns that heavily influenced the evolution of religious
freedom under the military government did not carry over to the
post-Pinochet period, (2) throughout the post-Pinochet period,
both questionable government treatment of smaller religious groups
and conventional rivalries between different religious groups and beliefs have dominated religious liberty developments, and (3) though
the Pinochet regime added several notable provisions to Chile’s national juridical framework defining the scope of religious freedom,
the consolidation of democracy in the post-Pinochet period has
greatly strengthened the country’s commitment to protecting freedom of religion. Part IV offers several observations on the course
that religious liberty in Chile might follow during the near future,
focusing on the potential benefits and problems associated with recent Chilean legislation regarding religious freedom, ecumenism,
and the involvement of religious groups in national politics.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN CHILE
PRIOR TO PINOCHET: 1818-1973
Topics such as freedom of religion cannot be adequately studied
or understood in a vacuum. Affected by and intermingled with such
factors as politics, church-state relations, and social values and attitudes, religious freedom can only be truly comprehended by also
understanding the various factors that determined the context in
which it has evolved.
Though a comprehensive examination of all of the historical factors that affected the development of religious liberty in Chile lies
beyond the scope of this Comment, this Part provides a concise
summary of the development of religious liberty and “religious history” in Chile prior to 1973. In addition to placing post-1973 developments related to religious liberty in historical context, this
summary reveals that: (1) the de jure establishment of religious freedom as a constitutionally protected right occurred only after more
than a century of de facto developments and practices favoring religious freedom and confrontation with the Chilean Catholic Church;
(2) by 1973, Chile’s juridical regime defining religious liberty guar-
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anteed the basic freedoms of belief and conscience but remained
largely undeveloped; and (3) by 1973, the “social question”21 had
become, with varying success, a central element of some religious
organizations’ beliefs and practices and, in many instances, had
blurred, if not erased, the line between religious belief and political
thought.
A. The Realization of De Jure and De Facto Religious Freedom:
1818-1925
For the first century of Chile’s existence as an independent state,
the nation’s constitutional regime proscribed religious freedom,
making Chile “one of the most [religiously] intolerant of the Catholic governments of South America.”22 Supported by various “proclamations, provisional statutes, and organic laws” promulgated during the first several decades following independence,23 each of the
five constitutions that governed Chile between 1818 and 1925
established Roman Catholicism as the state religion and severely restricted, if not altogether prohibited, the public exercise of nonCatholic religions.24 De jure religious exclusivity rather than religious
21. The term “social question” refers to “the continued growth of the urban and industrial proletariat and the intensified struggle between labor and capital” that developed in Chile
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at 196. More
specifically, the social question involved the working class’s fight for such issues as the right to
unionize/organize, the abolishment of child labor, and the establishment of minimum wages
and maximum hours of work. See id. “Thus [sic] the social question in Chile, as in the rest of
the Western world, consisted of political, social, and economic issues derived from the technological and demographic effects of industrialization during the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.” Id.
22. J. LLOYD MECHAM, CHURCH AND STATE IN LATIN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF
POLITICO-ECCLESIASTICAL RELATIONS 201 (Rev. ed. 1966).
23. Id.
24. As occurred in other Spanish American countries, Chile’s search for political stability
in the years following the realization of independence from Spain led to the adoption of multiple constitutions. Promulgated in 1818, 1822, 1823, 1828, and 1833, respectively, these constitutions differed from each other in various ways. See generally LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at
117-25 (detailing the general ideological and structural differences between Chile’s first five
constitutions). All, however, treated the “religious question” similarly by maintaining the supremacy of Catholicism and severely limiting, if not totally proscribing, freedom of religion.
Consider the provisions described below.
(1) The Constitution of 1818 declared that “[t]he Roman Catholic Apostolic religion is the sole and exclusive faith of the State of Chile. Its protection, conservation, purity, and
inviolability will be one of the duties of the chiefs of society who will never permit another
public cult or doctrine contrary to that of Jesus Christ.” MECHAM, supra note 22, at 202
(quoting 1 LEYES PROMULGADAS EN CHILE DESDE 1810 HASTA EL 10 DE JUNIO DE 1913, at
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53 (Ricardo Anguita ed., 1913) [hereinafter LEYES PROMULGADAS]). Also, the Constitution
stipulated that only Chilean citizens who lived in the country could be appointed to ecclesiastical positions, and acknowledged the government’s authority to appoint ecclesiastical officials
and control Church administrative matters. See id. (citing 1 LEYES PROMULGADAS, supra, at
55).
Known as the patronato real (“royal patronage”), MARK A. BURKHOLDER &
LYMAN L. JOHNSON, COLONIAL LATIN AMERICA 84 (2d ed. 1994), the authority granted to
the Chilean government over the Church’s affairs originated in the early sixteenth century,
when the Pope bestowed upon the Spanish monarchy “the right to name religious functionaries in the New World.” LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at 45. In exchange for this right, the Crown
“assumed responsibility to promote the conversion of the Amerindians and to support the colonial Church.” BURKHOLDER & JOHNSON, supra, at 84. With respect to the latter, the monarchy exercised control over (1) the “tithe income, [a] tax levied on agricultural production
and livestock[] [that] sustain[ed] the ecclesiastical hierarchy, its physical facilities, and its activities”; (2) the “founding of churches, convents, and hospitals,” id.; (3) the payment of clerics;
and (4) the ability of ecclesiastics to travel both within the colonies and between Spain and the
colonies. See id.
Though Chile and the other Spanish American countries claimed the right of the
patronato as an element of national sovereignty in conjunction with their realization of independence from Spain in the early- to mid-1820s, their individual claims met with mixed success for two principal reasons. First, for several decades following Spanish American independence, “papal policy tended to follow that of Spain . . . by withholding recognition” of the new
countries. HAROLD EUGENE DAVIS ET AL., LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY: AN
INTRODUCTION 76 (1977). Second, “difficult substantive issues” such as the patronato required “the negotiation of a treaty (concordat) recognizing Roman Catholicism as the national
religion and regulating Church-state relations. These concordats came much later [than diplomatic recognition usually did], generally after [1850], if at all.” Id. at 77. Despite receiving
official recognition from the Vatican in 1840, Chile never negotiated a concordat that provided it control over the patronato. See id. at 76, 77 n.14. Consequently, Chile’s “pretense to
national patronage . . . was without foundation or sanction,” making any Chilean exercise of
control over the patronato an arrangement “only of convenience” on the part of the Church.
MECHAM, supra note 22, at 212. For more information on the history of the patronato real as
well as Chile’s relations with the Vatican and endeavors to exercise the patronato, see generally
MECHAM, supra note 22, at 61-87, 202-05.
(2) The Constitution of 1822 added to the religious provisions of the Constitution
of 1818 the requirement that “[t]he inhabitants of the territory shall pay it (Roman Catholic
Church) the greatest respect and veneration, whatever might be their private opinions.”
MECHAM, supra note 22, at 205 (quoting 1 LEYES PROMULGADAS, supra, at 102-13). Moreover, the following article of the 1822 constitution classified “[a]ll violations of the preceding
article” as “a crime against the fundamental laws of the land.” Id. (quoting 1 LEYES
PROMULGADAS, supra, at 113).
(3) The Constitution of 1823 established Catholicism as the state religion, proscribed the public and private exercise of other religious faiths, and granted the president the
right of the patronato. See id. In addition, it required that each national senator “undertake an
investigation tour of the provinces to examine the status of religious and moral conditions.”
Id. (citation omitted).
(4) Like its predecessors, the Constitution of 1828 granted the executive the authority to negotiate concordats with the Vatican while limiting its ability to appoint Church
officials by requiring that candidates for bishop be presented to the lower house of the National Congress. See id. at 206. Unlike the three previous constitutions, however, the Constitu-
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freedom thus formed Chile’s constitutional standard prior to 1925.
Despite these constitutional restrictions, three interrelated, nonjuridical factors worked to render freedom of religion “a de facto reality”25 by the end of the nineteenth century. First, the arrival and
growth of non-Catholic religious groups throughout the nineteenth
century established the foundations of religious pluralism.26 Though
Chile’s non-Catholic population remained small, its presence nonetheless created a demand for religious freedom.

tion of 1828 permitted the private exercise of non-Catholic religions and protected individuals
from persecution based on their private beliefs. See id. Though these latest provisions suggested a somewhat more tolerant attitude toward religious liberty, a significant “retrogressive
step” occurred later in 1828 with the enactment of a law that criminalized and defined as blasphemy “all published attacks on the dogma of the Roman Catholic Church.” Id.
The Constitution of 1833 made “[n]o attempt . . . to reduce the severity of Chile’s
religious policy.” Id. Accordingly, the Constitution (1) established Catholicism as the state
religion and prohibited the public exercise of all other faiths; (2) required the president, in taking the oath of office, to “swear to observe and protect the Catholic religion,” id.; (3) empowered the president to exercise the patronato with the limitation that certain positions be ratified
by the Senate; (4) permitted the president to both maintain diplomatic relations and conclude
concordats with the Vatican; and (5) created the Council of State, “of which a Church dignitary must be a member, . . . to have cognizance over all matters of ecclesiastical patronage that
might be subject to litigation.” Id.
The five constitutions that governed Chile between 1818 and 1925 thus established
de jure religious exclusivity that identified Catholicism as the state religion and either prohibited or severely restricted religious liberty.
25. SMITH, supra note 15, at 71 (emphasis added).
26. Prior to 1925, the growth of Chile’s non-Catholic community stemmed primarily
from the arrival of non-Catholic immigrants and workers and the activities of Protestant missionaries. The first Protestant groups arrived in Chile in 1819, when the British and Foreign
Bible Society sent representatives to Santiago, see IGNACIO VERGARA, EL PROTESTANTISMO
EN CHILE 9-13 (1962), and the Anglican Church received special permission to construct two
parishes in the port city of Valparaíso. See Poblete, supra note 15, at 220-22. In the early
1820s, the British and Foreign Bible Society established several schools in Santiago and Valparaíso and was granted confiscated Catholic convents to serve as school facilities. See LUIS
GALDAMES, A HISTORY OF CHILE 216 (Isaac J. Cox ed. & trans., 1964); MECHAM, supra
note 22, at 206. Between 1840 and 1870, the arrival of German colonists, British engineers
and mine workers, and missionaries of various nationalities introduced the Lutheran and Presbyterian churches to Chile. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 37; SMITH, supra note 15,
at 71; VERGARA, supra, at 31-35, 36-43. Finally, Chile’s non-Catholic community increased
significantly between 1870 and 1925 with the arrival of additional Protestant denominations
(e.g., Methodism, the Christian Alliance and Mission, Seventh Day Adventism, Baptist Protestantism, the Salvation Army), other non-Catholic Christian churches (e.g., Greek Orthodoxy
and Catholicism of the Eastern Rite), and both Ashkenazi and Sephardic Judaism. See
VERGARA, supra, at 50-63, 73-75, 79-82, 89-95, 99-100; Gunter Böhm, Cuatro siglos de
Presencia Judía en Chile, REVISTA CHILENA DE HUMANIDADES, 1983 No. 4, at 93, 102-03.
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Second, the fact that “[t]he constitutional exclusion of the public
exercise of other [religions] was never completely enforced” 27 fortified religious pluralism and instituted a de facto basis for religious
freedom. From the early-nineteenth century, religious services held
by non-Catholic groups occurred “regularly and openly,”28 without
government interference, because public officials interpreted the
constitutional term “public exercise” “as not prohibiting religious
worship of non-Catholics inside buildings.”29
Third, and perhaps most important, Chilean politicians’ implementation of political liberalism and anticlericalism30 resulted in the
enactment of legislation that granted non-Catholics specific legal
rights,31 formally reinterpreted the constitutional language regarding
freedom of religion to provide legal protection and permission to
worship to all religious denominations,32 and severely curbed the
Catholic Church’s traditional socio-political authority and functions.33 Though efforts to enact constitutional amendments guaran27. MECHAM, supra note 22, at 207.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. The term “anticlericalism” refers to the liberal view that “the Catholic [Church]
tradition was one of sterility and oppression,” which mandated that the Church’s authority
should be restricted “to its strictly religious sphere because it was . . . an obstacle to modern
progress.” Id. at 417. Anticlericalism, therefore, “was not antireligious, but merely sought to
deprive the Church of those means and privileges which enabled it to exercise political power.”
Id.
31. See id. at 207-08 (describing laws allowing non-Catholics to marry according to
their own religious rites, conduct religious services in privately-owned facilities, and establish
and support private religious schools).
32. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 37; Poblete, supra note 15, at 222. Known
as the “Interpretive Law” (“Ley Interpretiva”), the government’s new construction of Article
Five of the Constitution of 1833 stated:
Article 1. It is declared that by Article 5 of the Constitution[,] those who do not
profess the Roman Catholic Apostolic religion are permitted to practice their cult inside private buildings.
Article 2. Dissidents are permitted to establish and support private schools for the
instruction of their children in the doctrine of their religion.
MECHAM, supra note 22, at 207-08 n.26 (quoting CONSTITUCIÓN Y LEYES POLÍTICAS DE LA
REPÚBLICA DE CHILE VIGENTE EN 1881, at 48 (1881)).
33. See GALDAMES, supra note 26, at 217 (noting that the founding of Santiago’s first
general cemetery clashed with the Church’s policy of interring the dead either inside or near to
a church); MECHAM, supra note 22, at 204, 211-14 (describing the government’s actions to
suppress religious orders and confiscate their property; abolish the state-collected tithe; place
the clergy on regular salaries paid by the government, thereby discontinuing the additional
wages formerly paid by the dioceses; donate dispossessed convents to Protestant schools; make
civil laws compulsory; place all civil records under state control; remove cemeteries from exclu-
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teeing religious liberty and achieve the separation of church and state
failed,34 the laws that were enacted successfully provided specific aspects of religious liberty with limited de jure protection and advanced de facto religious freedom in general by weakening the traditional privileges, authority, and activities of the Catholic Church.35
With the establishment of de facto religious liberty by the turn of
the century, two important developments marked the evolution of
religious freedom by 1925. First, religion ceased to be a socially and
politically divisive matter due to increasing religious tolerance and
indifference.36 Second, building upon both the nineteenth century’s
sive Church control; and eliminate the ecclesiastical fuero, or the right of clergymen to be tried
and punished by an ecclesiastical court rather than the national court system). It should be
noted that the Church’s defensive response to these developments further undermined its
socio-political authority. During the late nineteenth century, the Church sought to protect its
authority and resources from additional anticlerical restraints by strengthening its affiliation
with the Conservative Party. See SMITH, supra note 15, at 71. Several bishops became official
party members, numerous priests served as party representatives in the national legislature,
clergymen became heavily involved in local electoral campaigns, and Church funds occasionally
were used to support Conservative candidates in elections. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15,
at 37; SMITH, supra note 15, at 71. Not only did these events fail to prevent the erosion of its
traditional privileges but they also damaged the Church’s moral credibility and generated politically-related divisions between ecclesiastical officials. See SMITH, supra note 15, at 71.
34. See MECHAM, supra note 22, at 210, 214-15.
35. Though none of the government’s initial (pre-1850) anticlerical acts seriously
threatened the Church’s privileged standing, see id. at 206 (“The Church emerged [from these
incidents] practically unscathed in fortune and privilege.”) (citation omitted), the ecclesiastical
reforms of the late-nineteenth century “seriously weakened the Chilean Church; in a formal
encounter it had been defeated and humiliated; its prestige was shaken and thereafter it was
placed on the defensive.” Id. at 215.
36. See GALDAMES, supra note 26, at 429. Writing in 1911, the Chilean historian Luis
Galdames described this phenomenon, affirming that
[a] marked religious evolution . . . is to be noted throughout the country. It is not
that the people are leaving the Church; at least three fourths of the national population continue to be as sincerely Catholic as during former times. Nor does [the
Church] experience hostility from those who are not Catholic: the Protestants in the
republic are almost entirely foreigners, English, North Americans, or Germans, and
respectful toward all beliefs; the freethinkers do not constitute a group organized
against the Church; they are simply private persons who feel themselves free from
the necessity of complying with the precepts of any religion whatsoever. The evolution noted presents other manifestations—religious tolerance and religious indifference.
Today it is not a mark of honor in a believer to hate all other faiths except his
own, or the men who support or embody such faiths. In judging an individual, one
does not ask what religion he practices or what he believes. It is also obvious that
most people do not now pay attention to, or practice with the former diligence,
[various religious customs and rites]. . . . Even the political influence of the clergy
has diminished. . . . The republic has thus attained religious peace and an absolute

1194

THU-FIN.DOC

1185]

9/25/00 10:36 PM

Religious Liberty in Chile

de facto and de jure developments and the recent rise of religious tolerance and indifference, proponents of political liberalism in 1925
promulgated a new constitution that recognized, for the first time in
Chilean history, absolute de jure freedom of religion and separation
of church and state.37
Contrary to the exclusionist nature of its predecessors,38 the
Constitution of 1925 guaranteed the:
[p]ractice of all beliefs, liberty of conscience and the free exercise of
all religions not contrary to morality, good usage and public order.
Therefore, the respective religious bodies ha[d] the right to erect
and maintain houses for worship and accessory property under the
conditions of security and hygiene as fixed by the laws and regulations.39

In accordance with an agreement between the Chilean government
and the Catholic Church,40 the Constitution also granted religious
organizations certain rights with respect to property and facilities:
The churches, creeds and religious institutions of any ritual shall
have the rights in respect to their property that the laws now in
force stipulate or recognize; but they will be subject, under the
guarantees of this Constitution, to the general law in the exercise of
ownership of their future-acquired property.

liberty of worship that is founded in the customs of society and the very soul of the
people.
Id. at 429-30.
37. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 38. Unlike previous attempts to create a new
constitutional standard recognizing religious freedom and separation of church and state that
had failed in part due to opposition from the Catholic Church, the religious liberty-related
provisions of the Constitution of 1925 received the Church’s active support. See id. In particular, the Church agreed to support separation of church and state in return for certain concessions from the government: (1) the Church would be granted continued public legal status
and indemnified for confiscated properties, (2) state claims of authority over the appointment
of Church officials and administration of internal Church matters would be abolished, (3) public schools would continue to provide religious instruction, and (4) there would be no constitutional recognition of atheism. See id. Government officials accepted the Church’s terms and
ratified the arrangement through a concordat with the Vatican. See id.
38. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
39. CHILE CONST. of 1925 art. 10, no. 2 (General Secretariat, Organization of American States trans., 1972).
40. See supra note 37.
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Churches and accessory property intended for the service of any religious sect are exempt from taxation.41

The Constitution of 1925 thus achieved the recognition of a constitutional right to freedom of belief and conscience as well as the free
exercise of such beliefs while guaranteeing religious groups and organizations the right to own property and maintain houses of worship.
In addition, the Constitution of 1925 included several additional
guarantees that strengthened an individual or organization’s ability
to manifest belief and disseminate religious information. For example, Article 10 secured the “right of assembly without prior license,”42 “[t]he right of association without prior license and in conformity with the law,”43 and various rights derived from, or affiliated
with, the freedom of expression.44 Together, these provisions acted
to fortify their sister proviso guaranteeing the free exercise of religion
by protecting the ability to meet publicly or privately, form religious
associations, and share religious beliefs and information.45

41. CHILE CONST. of 1925 art 10, no. 2.
42. Id. no. 4.
43. Id. no. 5.
44. See id. no. 3. Section Three specifically affirmed the
[f]reedom to express, without prior censorship, opinions, either orally or in writing,
through the press, radio, . . . or any other medium, without prejudice to liability for
offenses and abuses that may be committed in the exercise of this liberty in the
manner and in the cases as determined by law . . . .
....
All streams of opinion shall have the right to utilize, under the conditions of equality
determined by law, publicity and communications media owned or used by private
sources.
Every natural or juridical person . . . shall have the right to organize, found and
maintain newspapers, magazines, periodicals and radio transmitting stations, under
the conditions established by law. . . .
The importation of and trading in books, printed matter and magazines shall be free
without prejudice to the regulations and taxes that the law may impose. It is forbidden to discriminate arbitrarily between newspaper, periodical, magazine and other
publishing firms, radio broadcasting . . . stations in matters relating to the sale or
supplying, in any form, of paper, ink, machinery or other work materials, or relating
to authorizations or permits that may be necessary for such acquisitions within or
outside the country.
Id.
45. In addition to constitutional guarantees relating to religious freedom, the Constitution of 1925 contained a transitory provision concerning church-state relations. The provision
(1) invalidated all laws pertaining to relations between the Church and Chilean government,
the patronato, and other related topics and (2) obligated the Chilean government to pay the
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The Constitution of 1925 thus marked the culmination of approximately eighty-five years of effort to realize de jure freedom of
religion. By guaranteeing the individual freedoms of belief, association, assembly, and expression, the separation of church and state,
and religious groups’ rights to possess property and buildings of
worship, the Constitution of 1925 achieved a number of firsts in
Chilean juridical history. Perhaps more importantly, however, it provided a solid, though relatively undeveloped, base from which religious liberty could continue to develop.
B. Religious Liberty, Religious Pluralism, and the Politicization of
Religious Doctrine and Practice: 1925-1973
The period 1925-1973 witnessed a dramatic slowing in the evolution of religious liberty in Chile. Chile’s juridical regime acknowledged the constitutional guarantees of the Constitution of 1925 and
the liberal reforms of the late-nineteenth century,46 but its scope and
depth developed only slightly, even though such religiously linked
issues as education provided fertile ground for occasional religious
liberty-related conflicts.47 Nevertheless, the existing regime ranked
Chile as “one of the most liberal nations in matters of religion.”48
Also, relations between the Chilean government and the Catholic
Church remained amicable throughout the period, allowing the
Church’s social prominence and authority to increase considerably.49
With respect to religious liberty during the Pinochet period, the
most significant “religious” developments between 1925 and 1973
involved the growth of religious pluralism and the politicization of
Church 2,500,000 pesos annually for five years for the purpose of easing the Church’s transformation into an independent organization. See id. transitory provision No. 1.
46. See MECHAM, supra note 22, at 220-22.
47. With respect to religious liberty-related battles associated with education, nonCatholics and proponents of religious liberty defeated efforts to require the teaching of Catholic doctrine in public elementary schools in the 1940s. See Situación de las iglesias evangélicas
en Chile, in LA IGLESIA Y LA JUNTA MILITAR, supra note 15, at 111-12. In the early 1970s,
the Catholic Church and other nonreligious elements of society (including the military) successfully countered Chile’s socialist government’s efforts to found “a National Unified School
system (ENU) requiring all public and private schools to adopt an ideology of ‘socialist
humanism’ under state supervision.” Smith, Catholic Church, supra note 15, at 326. Based on
the Church hierarchy’s theological opposition to Marxism, Chile’s bishops argued that the
ENU failed to provide “sufficient consideration to the ‘religious values which are part of the
spiritual patrimony of Chile.’” SMITH, supra note 15, at 198.
48. MECHAM, supra note 22, at 201.
49. See id. at 222.
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religious belief and practice. Driven by the arrival of Evangelical and
Pentecostal Protestantism from North America in the 1950s and
1960s, religious pluralism experienced unprecedented growth in the
two decades prior to 1973. Both variants of Protestantism, but especially Pentecostalism, expanded rapidly, and the number of their adherents quickly surpassed those of the historic Protestant churches
that had been in Chile since the mid- to late-nineteenth century.50
More importantly, the spread of Evangelical and Pentecostal Protestantism briskly increased the size of Chile’s total Protestant population from 1.4% of the national population in 1930 to 6.2% in 1970.51
Second, beginning in the 1930s, a growing tendency to identify
the “social question”52 with religious doctrine and practice led to the
growth of “social Christianity.” Social Christianity maintained that
an important part of Christian doctrine involved using political
means to reform societal institutions in a manner that benefited the
poor and ensured social equality.53 Politically, social Christians generally believed that their support for “a pluralist welfare-state democracy as the form of government most faithful to the principles of the
Christian gospels” represented a middle way between “liberal individualism and collectivist socialism.”54 The movement’s most extreme variation, known generally as “liberation theology,” drew on
developmental theory and Marxist precepts to call for the “liberation” of the poor by overthrowing the existing socio-political order

50. See generally WILLIAM R. READ ET AL., LATIN AMERICAN CHURCH GROWTH 10109 (1969) (describing the growth of Protestantism in Chile through 1967).
51. National census statistics placed the percentage of Protestants in the national population at 1.4 % in 1930, 2.3 % in 1940, 4.1 % in 1950, 5.6 % in 1960, and 6.2 % in 1970. See
EMILIO WILLEMS, FOLLOWERS OF THE NEW FAITH: CULTURE CHANGE AND THE RISE OF
PROTESTANTISM IN BRAZIL AND CHILE 265 tbl.VI (1967); Jean-Pierre Bastian, The Metamorphosis of Latin American Protestant Groups: A Sociohistorical Perspective, 28 LATIN AMER. RES.
REV. 33, 41 (1993) (citation omitted). By 1970, approximately eighty percent of Chile’s Protestant population belonged to a Pentecostal congregation. See READ ET AL., supra note 50, at
102 fig.26.
52. See supra note 21.
53. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 40-41; Paul E. Sigmund, The Transformation
of Catholic Social Thought in Latin America: Christian Democracy, Liberation Theology, and the
New Catholic Right, in ORGANIZED RELIGION IN THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF
LATIN AMERICA 41, 43 (Satya R. Pattnayak ed., 1994).
54. Sigmund, supra note 53, at 43. This type of “welfare-state liberalism” closely paralleled that of the “reformist liberal and social democratic” parties and governments in Europe,
the United States, and the British Commonwealth. Id. at 44.
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and instituting socialism.55 In both its general and extreme forms,
social Christianity represented a significant fusion of political
thought and religious belief.
Social Christianity made its greatest inroads among Catholics,
both lay members and clergy. Liberal elements of the historic Protestant churches also adopted versions of social Christian thought;56
however, most Evangelical and Pentecostal churches rejected social
Christianity in favor of more traditional, conservative views.57 As the
social Christian movement progressed between the late 1950s and
early 1970s, its adherents formed a variety of socially and politically
active groups and associations both within and without existing religious organizations.58
By the early 1970s, the extreme ideological polarization that had
torn apart Chile’s political parties59 also overwhelmed Chile’s religious climate and progressively fragmented social Christians into different groups. Not only did ideological differences increasingly pit
different religious groups against one another but they also created
severe divisions within religions.60 The Catholic Church, for example, suffered from cleavages between its socialist clergy and members,
moderate Church hierarchy, and conservative upper- and middleclass constituency. In very significant and terrible ways, these
“[p]olitical divisions made it impossible for many . . . groups to function as religious communities.”61 As one priest explained, “‘the
55. See generally ENRIQUE DUSSELL, HISTORY AND THE THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION: A
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE 28-31, 140-43 (John Drury trans., 1976); Sigmund, supra
note 53, at 51-54.
56. See O.E. COSTAS, THEOLOGY OF THE CROSSROADS IN CONTEMPORARY LATIN
AMERICA: MISSIOLOGY IN MAINLINE PROTESTANTISM: 1969-1974, at 86-90 (1976).
57. See DAVID MARTIN, TONGUES OF FIRE: THE EXPLOSION OF PROTESTANTISM IN
LATIN AMERICA 237-40 (1990).
58. See generally FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 40-59; LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at
273-89; SMITH, supra note 15, at 86-280.
59. See generally LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at 264-306 (describing how ideological polarization radicalized Chilean politics and essentially split Chilean politics into leftist and conservative camps).
60. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 55-59.
61. Id. at 56. Regarding the politicization and resultant polarization of religious life,
Brian Smith further explained:
In some cases, priests sympathetic to the transition to socialism made explicit efforts
to raise the political awareness of their new communities, and demanded of the
membership an active commitment to the leftist cause and to the transition to socialism. In other cases, the participants themselves often injected political issues into
the small group discussions of these communities, and in religious meetings openly
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community was quite political, because the formation it received was
intensely Christian. It brought faith and people’s lives together, and
people’s lives were political.’”62
Thus, though the period 1925-1973 did not generate significant
developments in the evolution of religious freedom, it did witness
two events that had profound implications for the development of
religious liberty in the immediate future. As Part III demonstrates,
the rise of Evangelical and Pentecostal Protestantism and politicization of religion through the evolution of social Christianity greatly
influenced the manner in which religious issues developed and were
resolved under and subsequent to the Pinochet regime.
C. Conclusion
The evolution of freedom of religion in Chile prior to 1973 was,
as the preceding discussion indicates, a most interesting saga. For
more than 100 years, Chileans did not enjoy a constitutionally protected freedom of belief and conscience, and the Catholic Church
remained the established state religion. The evolution of de facto
and, to a lesser extent, de jure religious freedom prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 1925 resulted from a unique combination of pressures generated by increasing religious pluralism fostered
by the immigration of non-Catholic persons and the influence of liberal anticlericalism. Moreover, the eventual adoption of constitutional provisions guaranteeing religious freedom and separation of
church and state came only as the result of granting the majority religion special legal status.
By 1973, religious freedom in Chile displayed several characteristics. First, there existed a constitutionally guaranteed right to exercise
the freedom of belief and conscience, but that right remained contingent upon whether the belief in question was not contrary to such
ambiguous concepts as morality, good usage, and public order. Second, there also existed constitutionally guaranteed rights to exercise
the freedoms of assembly, association, and expression. Third, though
clashed with other members who had different political convictions.
SMITH, supra note 15, at 262 (footnotes omitted). Based on interviews conducted throughout
Chile, Smith concluded “that, especially during the latter part of the [Allende] administration,
the problem of serious polarization of religious meetings was fairly widespread and, in [the]
perspective [of local clergy, religious, and lay leaders], quite disruptive to effective evangelization.” Smith, Chile, supra note 15, at 181 n.6 (citation omitted).
62. FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 56 (citation omitted).
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the constitutional regime no longer affirmed the union between
church and state, Chile’s majority religion continued to enjoy special
privileges enacted by concordat. Fourth, due largely to the rise of
Evangelical and Pentecostal Protestantism, religious pluralism had
reached unprecedented levels. Fifth, the extreme politicization of religious belief had resulted in the unification of the political and religious arenas, fragmented religious groups and organizations, and
heightened doctrinal differences between some religious groups.
III. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN CHILE, 1973-2000
Part III explores the development of religious liberty in Chile between 1973 and 2000, focusing on the manner in which religious
freedom evolved under the Pinochet regime and has developed under the “democratic” civilian administrations that succeeded the
military government. Specifically, this Part examines the evolution of
religious liberty as revealed by three particular factors: (1) the development of Chile’s national juridical framework; (2) the federal government’s perception and treatment of religious groups, beliefs, and
practices; and (3) the popular perception and treatment of religious
groups, beliefs, and practices. Rather than attempting a comprehensive analysis of these factors, the following sections will focus on the
Pinochet and post-Pinochet periods, respectively, before engaging in
comparative analysis of the developments that occurred during each
period.
A. The Evolution of Religious Liberty Under the Pinochet Regime:
1973-1990
I love my country. I love the people of Chile. I am proud that Chile is
now a country where people are free to speak, free to travel, and free to
pursue their political and religious views. We lost all these things for
a . . . brief period in the early 1970s. Yes, it took time to bring them
back. But I regard it as my greatest achievement that these freedoms
did indeed return.63

63. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, “My Wife Was in Tears, I Was Hurt and Bewildered,”
SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 8, 1998, at 2 (reprinting General Pinochet’s first public statement
following his arrest in the United Kingdom in October 1998 in response to the government of
Spain’s request that he be extradited to Spain to face murder and torture charges stemming
from his dictatorship in Chile between 1973 and 1990).
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[General Pinochet instituted] a criminal plot to execute a “systematic
plan . . . for political objectives” of illegal detentions, kidnappings, torture, and the deaths and disappearances of thousands of people of different . . . categories . . . defined by leadership roles, religious beliefs,
cultural characteristics and . . . professions . . . .64

The Pinochet period constituted a conspicuous aberration in the
development of religious liberty in Chile. Rather than evolving in response to such traditional forces as classic liberalism and religious
pluralism, freedom of religion under the Pinochet regime became
almost exclusively a function of the military government’s authoritarian, anti-Marxist national security ideology, policies, and concerns.
This extreme politicization of religious liberty resulted in the establishment of de facto religious intolerance, as individual clergymen and
religious organizations both suffered governmental and popular persecution in accordance with their perceived political position. While
Chile’s juridical regime succeeded in expanding its protection of religious liberty through both the enactment of national legislation and
the adoption of international treaties, de jure religious freedom fell
victim to the regime’s political focus. In addition to placing national
security-based restrictions on constitutional guarantees affecting the
free exercise of religious liberty, the military government suspended
many elements of the juridical system by ruling almost exclusively
through emergency powers. Freedom of religion under the Pinochet
dictatorship was thus characterized by contradictory developments
that worked to simultaneously further and restrict religious freedom.
1. Background: Pinochet and the institutionalization of military
antipolitics and “protected democracy,” 1973-1990
The dictatorial regime of General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte began in dramatic, brutal fashion on September 11, 1973, with a military coup d’etat against Chile’s constitutionally-elected, Socialist
president, Salvador Allende, under whose leadership Chile had experienced extreme political polarization and economic deteriora-

64. Home News, Press Association Newsfile, Nov. 4, 1998, available in LEXIS, Lexis
Library, Panews File (summarizing the argument of Mr. Alun Jones QC, of the Crown Prosecution Service, in a hearing held before the United Kingdom’s House of Lords to determine
whether General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte should be extradited to Spain).

1202

THU-FIN.DOC

1185]

9/25/00 10:36 PM

Religious Liberty in Chile

tion.65 Rather than returning the country to civilian rule, Pinochet
established a military government that, for the next seventeen years,
labored to “impos[e] a new social and political order upon Chile.”66
Based upon the ideological tenets of “military antipolitics”67 and
virulent anticommunism, the military government’s actions and policies sought to transform Chile morally, economically, and politically
in a manner that would safeguard la Patria (“the Fatherland”) from
the evils of traditional civilian politics and class conflict, and achieve
the “extirpation of Marxism.”68 Accordingly, the Pinochet regime
revamped the national economy according to neo-liberal economic
principles;69 replaced ideological and social pluralism “with the values
of conservative Catholicism, class harmony, and above all [sic] Chilean nationalism;”70 and modified the juridical system to legitimate
military rule and create a “protected democracy”71 under the mili65. See generally LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at 296-309 (describing the political and
economic conditions and events that occurred during President Allende’s administration).
66. Id. at 312.
67. Brian Loveman & Thomas M. Davies, Jr., The Politics of Antipolitics, in POLITICS
OF ANTIPOLITICS, supra note 15, at 3. The term “military antipolitics” refers to an ideology
held by the Latin American military that blamed “politics,” or the activities of civilian politicians, as the source of the economic underdevelopment, socio-political turmoil, and corruption
that existed throughout Latin America. See id. Influenced by the United States’ view of national security and counterrevolution agenda following the “fall” of Cuba to communism in
1959, military antipolitics also held politics and its attendant problems responsible for the lack
of regional stability and development and international communism’s penetration into the
Western Hemisphere. See id. at 9-10. In the 1970s, “military antipolitics became a predominant political form in Latin America,” id. at 10, maintaining that the military best fulfilled its
constitutionally mandated responsibility of safeguarding la Patria (“the Fatherland”) by rejecting traditional liberal democracy and employing direct military rule to achieve social order and
promote economic development. See id. at 10-13. Adhering to this doctrine, the military assumed power in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay by 1976. See THOMAS C.
WRIGHT, LATIN AMERICA IN THE ERA OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION 155-73 (1991).
68. WRIGHT, supra note 67, at 164 (quoting General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, Speech
(Sept. 11, 1975), in POLITICS OF ANTIPOLITICS, supra note 15, 205).
69. See generally LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at 317-21, 326-35 (detailing the Pinochet
regime’s economic program).
70. WRIGHT, supra note 67, at 164.
71. LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at 323 (quoting General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte). The
concept of “‘[p]rotected democracy,’ with the military institutions as the guarantors of the political and legal order and, implicitly, the adjudicators of their nations’ common good, permanent interests, and national security requirements, has a long history in Latin America.”
LOVEMAN, supra note 20, at 213. Professor Brian Loveman defined protected democracy as
a political model that sets vague formal limits on the scope of legal political activity
and reform, and it is premised on the notion that people must be protected from
themselves and from organizations that might subvert the existing political and social order. Such subversion, even when ostensibly legal, must be repressed. Groups
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tary’s guardianship.72 To further the government’s activities, Pinochet also (1) created a brutal security force responsible for ferreting
out Marxists and other subversive elements of society and for silencing opposition to the regime’s policies and practices73 and (2) institutionalized state terrorism.74
Though Pinochet initially received much popular support, especially from the upper- and middle-classes, the onset of a severe economic depression in 1981 resulted in popular demand for a return to
civilian government and widespread anti-regime demonstrations by
the mid-1980s.75 In October 1988, Pinochet lost a constitutionally
mandated plebiscite, allowing for the return of democratic rule in
1990.76 The Pinochet regime formally ended with the inauguration

with subversive aims . . . potentially threaten “national values,” the “permanent interests of the nation,” and, in the Latin American version, “the Western Christian
way of life.” Thus, . . . society requires guardians to defend these permanent values
against internal and external enemies. In Latin America, the armed forces . . . have
shouldered this historical mission, by constitutional and legislative prescription and
also by self-assignment.
Id. For a comprehensive discussion of protected democracy in Latin America, see generally id.
at 213-21, and Brian Loveman, “Protected Democracies”: Antipolitics and Political Transitions
in Latin America, 1978-1994, in POLITICS OF ANTIPOLITICS, supra note 15, at 366-97.
72. In the mid-1970s, the regime initiated “a new [juridical] institutional order,”
LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at 321, by adopting four “constitutional acts” that “amended or
eliminated certain parts of the Constitution of 1925” in accordance with the government’s
objectives and policies. Id. at 313. The government then promulgated a new Constitution in
1980, incorporating the values of antipolitics, anti-Marxism, and the military’s socio-economic
order. See id. at 269-70. The Constitution of 1980 formally established Chile as a protected
democracy by restricting popular and civilian political authority while simultaneously expanding the military’s political involvement and national security powers. See id. at 342.
73. See id. at 312; WRIGHT, supra note 67, at 167.
74. See WRIGHT, supra note 67, at 167. Acts of state terrorism included censorship, arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention, “disappearing” (or kidnapping) people, torture, and summary execution and murder. See id. at 162. Pinochet justified the use of state terrorism as a
necessary protection of human rights, stating that
[t]he greatest possible enforcement and highest respect for Human Rights implies
that these must not be exercised by those individuals who spread doctrines or commit acts which in fact seek to abolish them. This makes it necessary to apply restrictions as rigorous as the circumstances may require to those who defy the juridical
norms in force.
LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at 311 (quoting General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte).
75. See generally LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at 344-56 (reporting the onset of economic
depression and the Chilean public’s subsequent lack of support for the Pinochet regime between 1981 and the mid-1980s).
76. See Jay A. Sigler et al., Chile, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD 15, 33 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1991).

1204

THU-FIN.DOC

1185]

9/25/00 10:36 PM

Religious Liberty in Chile

of President Patricio Aylwin on March 11, 1990.77 Pinochet, however, retained a significant amount of political power as he, in accordance with the constitutional regime, served as head of the Armed
Forces in the new civilian administration.78 The end of the Pinochet
dictatorship thus marked more of a transition than an end to his involvement in the Chilean government.
2. Analysis: Freedom of religion under the Pinochet regime
A brief examination of the three factors mentioned in the introduction to this Section—the development of Chile’s national juridical framework; the Chilean government’s perception and treatment
of religious groups, beliefs, and practices; and the popular perception
and treatment of religious groups, beliefs, and practices—reveals that
the Pinochet period was a contradictory yet important era in the evolution of religious liberty in Chile. On one hand, the nation’s juridical framework made moderate strides in protecting and defining the
scope of those religious human rights first guaranteed by the Constitution of 1925. However, the military government’s practice of suspending civil rights and the politicization of both governmental and
popular perceptions and treatment of religious beliefs and groups
combined to prevent the full enjoyment of those religious libertyrelated freedoms and rights established by the national juridical regime. The Pinochet period was thus characterized by contradictory
developments that worked to simultaneously further and restrict religious freedom.
a. Developments in Chile’s national juridical regime. The religious liberty-related developments that occurred in Chile’s national
juridical regime under Pinochet involved three specific sources of national law: constitutional provisions outlining the basic freedoms and
legal guarantees associated with religious freedom, legislative and
administrative provisions protecting or defining religious liberty in
specific areas of law, and international legal norms resulting from
Chile’s obligations under international treaties.79 The developments
that transpired within these three sources of law collectively demonstrate that the juridical regime accomplished moderate yet notable
77. See id. at 34.
78. See id. at 33-34.
79. This discussion will not examine judicial decisions rendered by the Chilean courts
due to the nonprecedential nature of Chilean jurisprudence and lack of relevant cases.
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progress in defining the scope of religious liberty between 1973 and
1990.
(1) Constitutional provisions. For the first several years following the 1973 military coup, Chile nominally remained governed by
the Constitution of 1925. Chilean citizens and religious groups,
therefore, ostensibly continued to enjoy the right to freedom of conscience, the free exercise of beliefs that did not violate public morality or order,80 and all other religious liberty-related rights guaranteed
by the Constitution of 1925.81
These guarantees, however, were not enforced in practice. Upon
assuming power, the military government governed under a continuous state of siege,82 allowing it to indefinitely suspend all constitutionally enumerated guarantees, freedoms, and civil liberties, including those relating to religion.83 For its first few years in power,
the military government thus possessed the ability to legally punish
an individual for holding or manifesting particular religious beliefs
that it considered unacceptable or undesirable; infringe on religious
organizations’ capacity to own and maintain property; and abrogate
all other constitutional rights affecting religious freedom.84
Between December 1975 and September 1976, the junta enacted a series of “constitutional acts” that “amended or eliminated
certain parts of the Constitution of 1925—without fully replacing
it.”85 Constitutional Act Number Three,86 which defined various
“constitutional rights and guarantees,”87 closely paralleled the Constitution of 1925’s provisions governing freedom of religion. Article
11 of the Act guaranteed “[f]reedom of conscience and expression of

80. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
82. See Sigler et al., supra note 76, at 19, 23.
83. See LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at 310.
84. For examples of how the Pinochet regime exercised these powers, see infra Part
III.A.2.b.(1).
85. LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at 313; see also Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, Third Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile, at 10, IACHR
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.40 doc. 10 (1977) (discussing several of the changes made by the constitutional acts to the Constitution of 1925).
86. Decreto-Ley No. 1552, Sept. 11, 1976, D.O., 13 de septiembre de 1976, translated in Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 85, at 10, 10-16.
87. Id. ch. I, translated in Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note
85, at 10.
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all creeds and free exercise of all religions that do not violate moral
principles, good behavior or public order, therefore, enabling the
respective religious creeds to erect and maintain temples and outbuildings according to safety and sanitation measures required by
law.”88
In addition, the Act protected the freedoms of assembly,89 association,90 and expression of opinion and information.91 Through the
Act, however, the security-minded regime imposed new restrictions
on these freedoms, requiring that associations formed under the constitutional guarantee not be “contrary to moral principles, public order [or] the security of the State,”92 granting the national courts the
authority to limit the freedom of expression if the information circulated affected “moral principles, public order, national security or the
private life of individuals,”93 and prohibiting persons “who may have
been at any time convicted of attempting to subvert the institutional
order of the Republic” from not only owning, directing, or managing mass communications media, but also participating “in any
way. . . in functions connected with the publication or broadcast of
opinions or information.”94
The Constitutional Act Number Three thus closely paralleled the
Constitution of 1925’s provisions governing religious freedom while
placing restrictions on associated rights. Unlike those provisions,
however, some of the Act’s religious liberty-related guarantees remained enforceable even though the military government continued
to rule under emergency powers.95 Pinochet’s acceptance of the In-

88. Id. art. 1(11), translated in Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra
note 85, at 15.
89. See id. art. 7, translated in Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra
note 85, at 14.
90. See id. art. 9, translated in Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra
note 85, at 15.
91. See id. art. 12, translated in Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra
note 85, at 15.
92. Id. art. 9, translated in Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note
85, at 14.
93. Id. art. 12, translated in Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note
85, at 10.
94. Id., translated in Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 85, at
15.
95. See Sigler et al., supra note 76, at 26-28.

1207

THU-FIN.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9/25/00 10:36 PM

[2000

ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)96 in
1976 rendered nonderogable the right to freedom of belief and conscience and to adopt, maintain, or refuse religious beliefs.97 The right
to manifest one’s religion or religious beliefs, however, remained
subject to emergency limitations established by Chilean law.98
In 1980, the Pinochet regime replaced the Constitution of 1925
and the constitutional acts with a new constitution.99 Echoing its approach in Constitutional Act Number Three, the government essentially copied into the Constitution of 1980 the provisions of the
Constitution of 1925 that dealt with, or related to, religious freedom
while adding several additional security-related limitations to the
manner in which those freedoms could be exercised. For example,
Article 19, Section 6 guaranteed:
Freedom of conscience, manifestation of all creeds and the free exercise of all cults which are not opposed to morals, good customs
or public order;
Religious communities may erect and maintain churches and their
facilities in accordance with the conditions of safety and hygiene as
established by the laws and ordinances.
With respect to assets, the churches and religious communities and
institutions representing any cult shall enjoy the rights granted and
acknowledged by the laws currently in force. Churches and their facilities assigned exclusively for religious activities shall be exempt
from all taxes.100

With the exception of the last subparagraph regarding assets, the
Section’s language closely parallels that of the Constitution of
1925.101
Similarly, Article 19, Section 13 approximated the corresponding
96. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. The Allende government had ratified the ICCPR in 1972, but it was not until 1976 that General Pinochet promulgated that the Covenant should be acknowledged as national law. See Roland
Bersier, Legal Instruments of Political Repression in Chile, INT’L. COMMISSION JURISTS REV.,
June 1985, at 54, 59.
97. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
98. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
99. CHILE CONST. (Constitution of 1980) (official English translation).
100. Id. art. 19, no. 6.
101. Compare id. with supra notes 39, 41 and accompanying text.

1208

THU-FIN.DOC

1185]

9/25/00 10:36 PM

Religious Liberty in Chile

language in the Constitution of 1925 by recognizing “[t]he right to
assemble peacefully without prior permission.”102 Section 15, however, followed the Constitutional Act Number Three rather than the
Constitution of 1925, limiting the freedom of association in the interest of “morals, public order and Security of the State.”103 Conversely, Section 12’s recognition of the freedom of expression abandoned the restrictions placed on that particular freedom under the
Constitutional Act Number Three and essentially returned to the
language used in the Constitution of 1925.104
As with Constitutional Act Number Three, the ICCPR guaranteed that the Constitution of 1980’s guarantees regarding the right
of freedom of conscience and belief remained enforceable under
states of emergency.105 However, the remainder of the constitutional
rights and guarantees related to religious freedom failed to become
fully enforceable until after the re-establishment of civilian rule in
1990 due to the Pinochet government’s continued extension of its
emergency powers.106 Therefore, the effectiveness of the Constitution can only be gauged by examining it in the post-Pinochet period.
Regardless of its effectiveness, however, the Constitution of
1980 generally preserved the guarantees, if not the actual language,
of the Constitution of 1925’s provisions relating to religious freedom. Indeed, the only major manner in which the Constitution of
1980 deviated from the Constitution of 1925 lay in the imposition
of national security-oriented limitations on the freedom to associate.
(2) Legislative and administrative provisions. For the first several years of the Pinochet regime, national legislation and administrative decrees were enacted on an ad hoc basis to secure the military
government’s control over those institutions of Chilean society that
it believed to be controlled by, or sympathetic to, Marxism. With respect to religious liberty, such measures included the expulsion of
clergy and other religious personnel,107 occupation and closure of

102. CHILE CONST. (Constitution of 1980) art. 19, no. 13. Compare id. with supra note
42 and accompanying text.
103. CHILE CONST. (Constitution of 1980) art. 19, no. 15. Compare id. with supra note
92 and accompanying text.
104. See CHILE CONST. (Constitution of 1980) art. 19, no. 12. Compare id. with supra
note 44 and accompanying text.
105. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
106. See Sigler et al., supra note 76, at 28-30.
107. For more information on this subject, see infra Part III.A.2.b.(1).

1209

THU-FIN.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9/25/00 10:36 PM

[2000

private schools and universities owned and operated by religious organizations, elimination of subsidies to privately owned schools, appointment of military rectors over church-owned universities, seizure
of mass communications media equipment owned by religious organizations, prohibition against teaching Marxism or similar ideologies in religious schools, and the dismissal of teachers believed to be
affiliated with any variant of Marxist thought.108
Upon consolidating its power and implementing its sociopolitical and economic agenda by the mid-1970s, the military government’s legislative efforts assumed a more programmed, comprehensive nature and outlook. By the late 1980s, this new focus led the
regime to legislate a variety of areas and subjects that directly or indirectly affected the individuals’ and religious organizations’ ability to
maintain, manifest, and disseminate their respective religious beliefs.
Consider, for example, the laws dealing with the following subjects.
(i) Discrimination on the basis of religion. Though the constitutional regime did not outlaw discrimination on the basis of religion, several laws guaranteed such protection in certain circumstances
or to specific groups. For example, the Ministry of Labor and Social
Foresight issued several decrees that prohibited employers from conditioning the employment of a prospective or actual employee on his
or her religious affiliation or beliefs.109 Also, the Ministry of the Interior stipulated that nonprofit community organizations must respect
the religious convictions of their members.110
(ii) Dissemination of religious information and materials.
Though the Pinochet regime never formally attempted to regulate or
limit proselyting in general, one of its earliest laws potentially prevented certain individuals or groups from engaging in proselytism by
prohibiting the entry into Chilean territory of persons (either Chilean nationals or foreigners) who promulgated ideas that opposed the
country’s social order or system of government or who committed
acts contrary to national security, public order, or the interest of the
108. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 62; Poblete, supra note 15, at 228.
109. See Ley No. 18,620, 27 de mayo de 1987, DIARIO OFFICIAL [hereinafter D.O.], 6
de julio de 1987, art. 2; Ley No. 18,372, 12 de diciembre de 1984, D.O., 17 de diciembre de
1984, art. 1. All Chilean statutes and administrative decrees cited in this Comment can be located on the Internet by performing a search under the “Buscar Leyes” icon found at
http://www.congreso.cl/biblioteca/biblioteca.html, the official website of Chile’s National
Congressional Library (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional).
110. See Ley No. 18,893, 26 de diciembre de 1989, D.O., 30 de diciembre de 1989, art.
3.
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country.111 Also, another series of laws directly limited some individuals’ ability to engage in proselyting activities by disallowing
members of cooperative societies and nonprofit community organizations from proselyting.112 The text of this particular law remained
unclear as to whether this prohibition was absolute or applied only to
the course of a person’s involvement in such an organization.113
(iii) Education. Continuing pre-existing practices and
regulations, the military government allowed private religious
schools to freely teach their respective doctrines114 and required public schools to offer general courses on religion and values but did not
obligate students to take such classes in order to graduate.115 As part
of the national education curriculum, binding on both public and
private schools, the government also mandated that nonreligion
courses teach about general religious themes and practices.116 In
both public and private schools, teachers of courses about particular
religions or religious beliefs had to be certified by the local ecclesiastical authority of that religion.117 Also, parents of students attending
a private religious school could formally request that their children
not be educated according to the beliefs of the sponsoring religion;
however, they could not demand that the school provide instruction
about a different religious creed.118
(iv) Military service. Though it did not recognize the right
of conscientious objection, the regime allowed ministers and “religious persons” (an undefined term that theoretically included clergymen, monks and nuns, missionaries, and other similar persons) of
all religions to receive exemptions from compulsory military service.119 The granting of such exemptions, however, required that the

111. See Decreto-Ley No. 604, 9 de agosto de 1974, D.O., 10 de agosto de 1974, arts 12.
112. See Ley No. 18,893, art. 3; Decreto No. 502, 1 de septiembre de 1978, D.O., 9 de
noviembre de 1978.
113. See Ley No. 18,893, art. 3.
114. See Decreto No. 924, 12 de agosto de 1983, D.O., 7 de enero de 1984, art. 5.
115. See id.; Decreto No. 76, 7 de mayo de 1985, D.O., 15 de mayo de 1985, art. 2.
116. See, e.g., Decreto No. 43, 19 de marzo de 1984, D.O., 17 de mayo de 1984, art. 3
(requiring courses on plastic arts to teach about the religious use and significance of masks).
117. See Decreto No. 924, art. 9; Decreto No. 1191, 24 de octubre de 1978, D.O., 28
de noviembre de 1978, 28.
118. See Decreto No. 924, art. 5.
119. See Decreto-Ley No. 2306, 2 de agosto de 1978, D.O., 12 de septiembre de 1978,
art. 17(6); Decreto No. 244, 1 de marzo de 1979, D.O., 3 de mayo de 1979, art. 43(6).
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individual’s petition for an exemption be (1) accompanied by an official statement by his or her religious superior confirming the

petitioner’s religious status or position and (2) approved by the Director General of the Ministry of National Defense.120
(v) Prisoners’ rights. As part of the government’s program
for rehabilitating prisoners, incarcerated persons were guaranteed
participation in religious activities.121 The Ministry of Justice’s Department of Rehabilitation was assigned the responsibility of providing for and supervising such activities.122
(vi) Taxation. In addition to the constitutional provisions
declaring property and facilities used for religious purposes to be exempt from taxation, the regime enacted several laws that exempted
certain religious organizations from having to pay stamp taxes,123
municipal registration fees and taxes,124 and various import duties.125
Also, individuals or other juridical persons who donated funds or
other materials to a religious organization or group could receive a
tax deduction in accordance with their donation if their donation
went to constructing religious edifices on land granted by the government to that particular organization.126
(vii) Terrorism. One of the most intriguing laws enacted
by the Pinochet government involved protecting religious authorities
from assassination and the infliction of bodily harm. Included among
those acts considered to be “terrorist acts” were attempts to take the
life of, or inflict bodily harm upon, religious authorities.127 Unfortunately, the law did not state the meaning of the term “religious authorities” and was passed after government security forces and non-

120. See Decreto-Ley No, 2306, art. 17(6); Decreto No. 244, art. 43(6).
121. See Decreto-Ley No. 2859, 12 de septiembre de 1979, D.O., 15 de septiembre de
1979, art. 8(b)(2).
122. See id.
123. See Decreto No. 2106, 31 de diciembre de 1974, D.O., 16 de enero de 1975, art.
1(6).
124. See Decreto-Ley No. 3063, 24 de diciembre de 1979, D.O., 29 de diciembre de
1979, art. 27.
125. See Decreto-Ley No. 3475, 29 de agosto de 1980, D.O., 4 de septiembre de 1980,
art. 23(9).
126. See Decreto-Ley No. 574, 10 de junio de 1974, D.O., 11 de octubre de 1974, art.
188.
127. See Ley No. 18,314, 16 de mayo de 1984, D.O., 17 de mayo de 1984, art. 1(2).
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government paramilitary groups had executed or tortured many
Catholic and Protestant clerics.128
Though none of these laws individually made an overwhelmingly
significant impression on the development of religious liberty in
Chile, they collectively added substance and definition to the national juridical regime defining and governing religious freedom.
Thanks to such laws, for example, workers enjoyed protection
against discrimination on the basis of religion, and prisoners received
the guarantee that they would and could engage in religious activities. Moreover, parents received the right to enroll their children in a
private school operated by a religious organization while controlling
the religious formation that their children received. The military
government’s legislative provisions thus further defined the manner
in which religious belief could be maintained, manifested, and disseminated.
(3) International legal norms. Pinochet’s government acknowledged as legally binding two international instruments that related to religious liberty: the ICCPR in 1976129 and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)130
in 1989 (less than one year prior to the regime’s end).131 It should
be recognized, however, that the ICCPR had more significance than
the ICESCR during the Pinochet period, because the ICCPR both
became obligatory more than a decade earlier and, as the following
discussion demonstrates, addressed a greater number of issues associated with religious freedom.
With respect to the development of religious liberty in Chile, the
ICCPR’s importance stemmed primarily from its institution of various rules and guarantees not recognized in the country’s various
constitutional or legislative provisions. Examples of such rules and
guarantees included: (1) a general prohibition against discrimination
on the basis of religion;132 (2) the right to adopt a religion or belief
of one’s choice, either individually or with others, and to manifest

128. For more information regarding the killing and torturing of religious personnel, see
infra Part III.A.2.b.
129. For information on the Pinochet government’s acceptance of the ICCPR, see supra
note 96.
130. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
131. See generally Decreto No. 326, 28 de abril de 1989, D.O., 27 de mayo de 1989.
132. See ICCPR, supra note 96, at 173, art. 2(1).
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that religion or belief in “worship, observance, practice and teaching”;133 (3) the prohibition of coercion in an individual’s decision to
adopt or refuse to adopt religious beliefs;134 (4) the prohibition of
the advocacy of “religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence”;135 (5) the protection of children
against discrimination on the basis of religion;136 (6) the guarantee
that the law will not discriminate on the basis of religion;137 and (7)
the right of religious minorities to profess and practice their religion.138 It should be remembered that the Chilean juridical regime in
some fashion already recognized, or would thereafter sanction, several of these rights, including the general freedom of religion, belief,
or conscience,139 and the ability of parents to ensure the religious and
moral teaching of their children.140
Perhaps the ICCPR’s most significant provision affirmed the inviolability of religious freedom by prohibiting the derogation of the
right to exercise the freedom of conscience and belief even in emergency situations.141 With this provision, the ICCPR constituted the
only element of Chile’s juridical framework that, at least after 1976,
unconditionally guaranteed the freedom of belief and conscience and
right to adopt, maintain, or refuse religious beliefs. The right to
manifest one’s religion or religious beliefs, however, remained subject to emergency limitations established by Chilean law.142
Ratification of the ICESCR in 1989 bolstered Chile’s obligation
to observe two notable provisions of the ICCPR. The ICESCR, like
the ICCPR, proscribed all discrimination on the basis of religion143
and bestowed upon parents the right to “ensure the religious and
moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.”144 Chile’s ratification of the ICESCR consequently reinforced its commitment to honor these two provisions of the ICCPR.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
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See id. at 179, art. 27.
See id. at 173, art. 18(1).
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(4) Conclusion. Collectively, the religious freedom-related juridical developments discussed above indicate that during the Pinochet dictatorship Chile’s national juridical regime made relative progress in defining and protecting the scope of religious freedom in
Chilean society. Though it placed new national security-related limitations on the freedom of association, the Constitution of 1980
maintained the Constitution of 1925’s guarantees and limitations regarding the freedoms of belief and conscience, assembly, and expression. Moreover, various legislative provisions enacted by the military
government made moderate advances in the application of religious
freedom to diverse areas of law and society. Perhaps most importantly, however, the military regime’s acceptance of the ICCPR introduced new religious rights and broadened the scope of those recognized by Chile’s constitutional or legislative provisions. The
Pinochet period thus achieved moderate progress in broadening the
meaning and scope of religious freedom in Chile’s juridical regime.
b. Governmental perception and treatment of religious groups, doctrines, and practices. Throughout Pinochet’s dictatorship, the military government viewed religious doctrines and activities in the same
manner it viewed the rest of Chilean society—according to the politicized values, goals, and fears associated with the regime’s antiMarxist interpretation of military antipolitics and national security.
The Pinochet regime consequently perceived the beliefs and actions
of both religious groups and individuals as antagonistic and dangerous if they appeared to sympathize with or defend Marxism or as
supportive and beneficial if they coincided with the military’s thinking and goals. Not surprisingly, perceived opposition to the government generated harassment, persecution, torture, and even death;
perceived support, however, resulted in favoritism and the enjoyment
of special privileges.
(1) Government treatment of opposition groups. The manner in
which the military government treated clergymen and religious
groups perceived as supporting Marxism or opposing the government forms the most widely publicized and studied aspect of religious liberty in the Pinochet period.145 Most scholars who address
this theme, however, focus exclusively on the military’s violation of
press, legal, or human rights,146 failing to note that the government’s
145. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
146. See id.
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oppressive treatment of clergymen and religious organizations
directly affronted the constitutional right to free exercise of belief
and liberty of conscience.
Viewed generally, the regime’s treatment of religious authorities
and groups that it perceived as adversarial progressed through three
distinct periods or phases. First, from 1973 to 1976, the government
brutally repressed individual clergymen and religious groups believed
to adhere to, or sympathize with, Marxist beliefs.147 Though the
military did not expressly focus on religion as part of its anti-Marxist
campaign, neither did it exempt religious issues and activities from its
persecution of leftist ideas and groups.148 Consequently, government
forces arrested, detained, expelled, assaulted, tortured, or killed a total of several hundred “religious persons” (including Protestant ministers and missionaries as well as Catholic priests, monks, and nuns)
who allegedly belonged to leftist political groups (e.g., Catholics for
Socialism, the Chilean Communist Party), provided aid and comfort
to alleged Marxists, or actively espoused liberation theology or other
liberal variations of social Christianity.149 Also, in 1974 the govern147. Note that in 1975, a Chilean Jew unsuccessfully attempted to link the detainment
and supposed death of his son with anti-Semitism, alleging that “there [was an] anti-Semitic
element in [a Chilean government] plot to identify [a] series of bodies [that] turned up . . . in
Argentina as those of Chilean extremists.” Telegram from U.S. Embassy in Santiago to U.S.
Department of State 1 (Aug. 1975) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Telegram August
1975]. The United States Embassy in Chile, however, rejected the claim as “unlikely.” Id. The
Embassy’s conclusion concurred with the findings of a 1974 human rights report authored by
the Chicago Commission of Inquiry into the Status of Human Rights in Chile, which visited
Chile several months after the coup to investigate human rights conditions. See CHICAGO
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, REPORT OF THE CHICAGO COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE
STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE 1-2 (1974) [hereinafter CHICAGO COMMISSION]. In its
report, the Commission asserted that “there is no campaign of anti-semitism [sic] by the
Junta” due the regime’s fear “of projecting a fascist image abroad.” Id. at 25. Moreover, the
Commission noted that General Gustavo Leigh, a member of the junta, provided the head of
Chile’s Jewish community with assurances “that there will be no anti-semitism.” Id.
148. Indeed, the regime’s predisposition to equate political attitudes with religious beliefs
remains clearly illustrated by the following statement made by General Pinochet about a
Catholic priest who was “disappeared” by security forces: “He is not a priest, he’s a Marxist!”
“Solo así Cantan los Marxistas”, NOVEDADES, Feb. 10, 1998, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Noveda File (“[E]se no es un cura, es un marxista!”).
149. See, e.g., Human Rights in Chile: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int’l. Orgs., 94th
Cong. 2-3 (1975) (prepared statement of Rev. Daniel A. Panchot, C.S.C.) (detainment, torture, and expulsion of Catholic priest in November 1975) [hereinafter Hearings]; SHEILA
CASSIDY, AUDACITY TO BELIEVE 165-331 (1977) (government attack on a religious residence;
arrest, torture, detainment, and expulsion of physician and prospective Catholic nun for
providing medical aid to alleged leftist terrorist); CHICAGO COMMISSION, supra note 147, at 4
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ment disbanded two minority religious groups that, in its view,
threatened public morality and order.150
(“at least three” priests killed, 130 expelled, and “many tortured” between September 1973
and February 1974); TERESA DONOSO LOERO, LOS CRISTIANOS POR EL SOCIALISMO EN
CHILE 212, 223-24, 237-38, 240, 243, 256, 265-66 (3d ed. 1976) (expulsion of Bishop
Helmut Frenz, head of the Lutheran Church in Chile and co-president of COPACHI in 1975
for engaging in “anti-national activities” and endangering Chile’s national security; detainment
of various Catholic priests and religious personnel for allegedly participating in leftist terrorist
forces and pro-Marxist activities, providing aid to Marxists and terrorists, and stashing weapons); Juan Carlos Garcia, One Man Who Rejoices in Arrest of Pinochet, TORONTO STAR, Oct.
24, 1998, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Tstar File (arrest and detainment of Bishop
Helmut Frenz in 1973 for harboring fugitives); Luis Mendez, Denuncia Obispo Luterano Persecuciones de Pinochet, EL NORTE, Feb. 10, 1998, at 12, available in 1998 WL
6411791(Catholic priest “disappeared” by progovernment forces in 1974); Pinochet’s Henchman Tortured My Brother to Death but Only Now Can I Tell His Story, EXPRESS, Feb. 29,
2000, available in 2/29/00 WL BSX-DYEXP (Catholic priest tortured to death in 1973)
[hereinafter Pinochet’s Henchman]; Reconoce soldado chileno ser asesino de sacerdote, REFORMA,
Mar. 16, 1998, at 7, available in DIALOG, File No. 749 [hereinafter Reconoce soldado] (former Chilean soldier admitted killing Catholic priest in 1973); Telegram from U.S. Embassy in
Santiago to U.S. Dep’t of State 1-2 (Dec. 1975) (copy on file with author) (release of five
Catholic priests detained for aiding leftist terrorists); Telegram from U.S. Embassy in Santiago
to U.S. Dep’t of State 1-3 (Nov. 1975) (copy on file with author) (several Catholic nuns detained, for aiding members of terrorist organizations); Telegram from U.S. Embassy in Santiago to U.S. Dep’t of State 1-2 (Oct. 1975) (copy on file with author) (detainment of two
Presbyterian pastors due to affiliation with “subversive organizations”; status as “religious leaders” prompted security forces to take “special care” with them) [hereinafter Telegram October
1975]; Telegram from U.S. Embassy in Santiago to U.S. Dep’t of State 1-3 (June 1974) (copy
on file with author) (prolonged detainment of Catholic priests who opposed military’s seizure
of Catholic-owned school).
It should be noted that in 1991 the Chilean National Truth Commission determined that only three “religious” persons had died as victims of government agents, politically
motivated private citizens, or political violence between 1973 and 1990. See NATIONAL
COMMISSION, supra note 13, at 904 tbl.9. The Commission’s report, however, directly conflicts with other accounts, which collectively indicate that at least five religious persons were
killed between 1973 and 1984. See CHICAGO COMMISSION, supra note 147, at 4, 10, 12 (at
least three priests killed in the first several months following the coup, including Fathers Joan
Alsina and Gerardo Poblete); Jackson Diehl, ‘This Isn’t Just Poland, This is Chile Again’,
WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 1986, at A27 (Father Andres Jarland killed by police during September
1984 demonstration); Pinochet’s Henchmen, supra (Father Michael Woodward tortured to
death in 1973); see also Reconoce Soldado, supra (former Chilean soldier, Nelson Banados, admitted killing Father Joan Alsina in 1973); cf. Tito Drago, Rights-Chile: Spanish Judge Issues
Indictment Against Pinochet, Global Information Network, Dec. 10, 1998, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Inpres File (Spanish judge issued indictment against Pinochet, charging
Pinochet with killing and/or torturing approximately 2000 people, including “seven clergy
and religious workers”).
150. The expelled groups included (1) the Inner Religion of Siloism, a nontraditional
religious group suspected of being “a politically motivated group with connections to” leftist
terrorist organizations, Telegram from U.S. Embassy in Santiago to U.S. Dep’t of State 1-2
(Mar. 1974) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Telegram March 1974], and (2) the Divine Light Mission, formed by followers of the guru Maharaj Jigroup, see JUAN GUILLERMO
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Second, between 1976 and 1982, the military government attempted to intimidate religious organizations into ceasing their individual and collective efforts to promote a return to civilian rule and
provide aid to victims of governmental oppression. This period witnessed two important developments with respect to the government’s perception of opposition religious groups. First, various religious organizations, and especially the Catholic Church, issued
increasingly harsh criticisms of the regime’s human rights practices
and called for a return to civilian government.151 Second,
interdenominational efforts to provide assistance to victims of the
regime’s repression culminated in the creation of the Vicariate of
Solidarity. The Vicariate, though, was not the first organization of its
kind. As early as 1973, the Catholic Church had joined with several
historic and Pentecostal Protestant churches, the Greek Orthodox
Church, and several Jewish organizations to form the National
Committee to Aid Refugees (CONAR), which assisted leftist
immigrants who had arrived in Chile during the Allende years to
emigrate from Chile,152 and the Cooperative Committee for Peace in
Chile (COPACHI), which provided legal and other aid to persons
who had suffered from the military’s repressive activities.153 However,
internal divisions and pressure from the government forced
COPACHI to dissolve in November 1975.154
In 1976, the Catholic Church joined with a lesser number of
non-Catholic organizations to form the Vicariate of Solidarity, which
provided a partial umbrella of protection for numerous community

PRADO O., SECTAS JUVENILES EN CHILE 90-92 (1984), which the government accused of being a “financial racket[]” and teaching values that opposed public order. Telegram March
1974, supra, at 2 (mislabeling The Divine Light Mission as “Luz Blanca”).
151. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 63-65.
152. See SMITH, supra note 15, at 313; see also Smith, Chile, supra note 15, at 163 (“By
February 1974, CONAR had helped approximately five thousand foreigners (who had come to
Chile during the Allende years as a haven of freedom from repressive regimes in other parts of
Latin America) to leave Chile safely.”).
153. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 61-62; LOWDEN, supra note 15, at 32-36,
38-51; see also Hearings, supra note 149, at 1-2; CASSIDY, supra note 149, at 126-27.
154. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 62; LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at 317; see also
CASSIDY, supra note 149, at 128-29 (arrest, prolonged detainment, and torture of three female
COPACHI staff members); THOMAS C. WRIGHT & RODY OÑATE, FLIGHT FROM CHILE:
VOICES OF EXILE 47-48 (Irene B. Hodgson trans., 1998) (comments by volunteer with
COPACHI about government’s efforts to force COPACHI’s dissolution by putting “heavy
pressure” on Church hierarchy and making “systematic effort” to denounce individual members).
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organizations, research institutes, and human-rights defense
groups. . . . The Vicariate also extended material support to the urban and rural poor, provided technical assistance to small farmers,
published magazines for popular education, and maintained records
on political detainees and “disappeared” persons . . . .155

Together, these functions rendered the Vicariate “the single most
important source of moral opposition to the dictatorship.”156
Perceiving these developments as evidence of disloyalty, subversiveness, and “naive moralis[m],”157 the Pinochet regime responded
by attempting to intimidate the religious organizations involved into
ceasing their criticisms and dissolving the Vicariate.158 Though these
155. LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at 317; see also FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 66-67;
Smith, Chile, supra note 15, at 165-66. For a comprehensive discussion of the Vicariate’s activities through the mid-1980s, see generally JUAN IGNACIO GUTIÉRREZ FUENTE, CHILE: LA
VICARÍA DE LA SOLIDARIDAD (1986), LOWDEN, supra note 15, at 53-128.
156. LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at 317. It should also be noted that following the dissolution of COPACHI in 1975, the Methodist, Pentecostal, and Orthodox churches—none of
which participated in the Vicariate—formed a new ecumenical social institution, the Social Assistance Foundation of the Christian Churches (FASIC). See Chile: Ecumenical Body Supports
Program for Returned Exiles, Inter Press Service, Jan. 29, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Inpres File. Like the Vicariate, FASIC was formed in 1976 and “committed [itself] to
the defence [sic] of human rights in a Christian perspective” by providing legal aid, social assistance, and medical treatment to political prisoners and their families. TREVOR BEESON &
JENNY PEARCE, A VISION OF HOPE: THE CHURCHES AND CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA 151
(1984). Together with the Chilean government, FASIC also established a prisoner release program that allowed “sentenced political prisoners to commute their sentence to exile, provided
another country [was] willing to receive them.” Id. Internationally, FASIC worked with the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) “in assisting those refugees
who . . . decided to return to Chile and [were] legally allowed to return but suffer[ed] considerable difficulties in re-adapting and finding employment.” Id. Though FASIC paralleled the
Vicariate in its provision of many forms of aid to Chilean society, FASIC’s lack of opposition to
the regime and close ties to the Protestant community (which largely supported, and was actively courted by, the regime, see infra notes 172-178 and accompanying text) apparently
maintained the organization within the military government’s good graces.
157. FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 68.
158. See SMITH, supra note 15, at 319. The government’s chosen methods of intimidation included: (1) expelling religious authorities, see PENNY LERNOUX, CRY OF THE PEOPLE:
UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN THE RISE OF FASCISM, TORTURE, AND MURDER AND THE
PERSECUTION OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN LATIN AMERICA 298 (1980) (government’s
practice of harassing, detaining, and expelling clergy); SMITH, supra note 15, at 332 tbl.9.3
(loss/expulsion of 64 non-Chilean Catholic priests between 1975 and 1979); (2) using its
control of the national press to criticize the organizations’ activities and views, see LOWDEN,
supra note 15, at 60-61(national media criticized the Vicariate and the Catholic Church of
conspiring with leftist groups); SMITH, supra note 15, at 319 (government-controlled media
unleashed “public attacks and harassment” against Vicariate); Smith, Chile, supra note 15, at
175 (by late 1977, government spokespersons attempted to discredit Vicariate by charging that
it “was harboring Marxists and taking money from abroad to support political dissidents in
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measures further polarized Catholic-State relations and complicated
the Vicariate’s work, the religious organizations’ criticisms and social
Chile”); see also LERNOUX, supra at 298 (Pinochet regime attempted to use resources provided
by United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to discredit Catholic Church through use
of “smear campaigns in the government-controlled media”); (3) conducting police raids on
houses of worship and religious residences, see Smith, Catholic Church, supra note 15, at 33132 (“Various diocesan affiliates of the Vicariate were raided, rectories and convents in lowincome areas continued to be closely watched, and local [base communities] working closely
with the Vicariate harassed.”); Charles A. Krause, For U.S. Priest in Chile, ‘Liberation Theology’
Means Bringing Dignity to Poor, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 1979, at A16 (security forces searched
home of Catholic priest “looking for guns, subversive literature or possibly persons wanted for
questioning in connection with labor or political activities”); (4) attempting to cut off foreign
funding provided to the Catholic Church (and other Chilean churches as well) by the InterAmerican Foundation (IAF), see SMITH, supra note 15, at 328-29 (attempts to freeze IAF
funds entering Chile through Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) failed due to international pressure); and (5) detaining and harassing Church officials and Vicariate employees, volunteers, and facilities. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 62; see also PENNY LERNOUX,
NOTES ON A REVOLUTIONARY CHURCH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA 17-18 (1978)
[hereinafter LERNOUX, NOTES ] (government officials’ violent reception of three Catholic
bishops, all of whom were critical of regime, upon bishops’ return to Chile from visit to Ecuador); LOWDEN, supra note 15, at 58-59 (expulsion of attorneys affiliated with the Vicariate);
Smith, Chile, supra note 15, at 175 (“Diocesan affiliates of the [V]icariate in various parts of
the country were raided and personnel harassed. . . . Rectories, convents, and base communities experienced similar raids and surveillance, and in 1980 harassment tactics against
neighborhood church projects . . . increased for a time once again.”); Krause, supra, at A19
(arrest of Catholic priest for participating in antigovernment demonstration in 1978); Telegram from U.S. Embassy in Santiago to U.S. Dep’t of State 2 (Oct. 1976) (copy on file with
author) (detention of Catholic Bishop of Talca’s private secretary “another specific example of
[government] pressure” against the Church); cf. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 98TH CONG.,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1982, at 441 (1983) [hereinafter
1982 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS] (“Some [Catholic] Church activists and human rights lawyers have during 1982 been anonymously threatened.”); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 97TH CONG.,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1981, at 376 (1982) [hereinafter
1981 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS] (“[Catholic] Church activists and human rights lawyers have
been anonymously threatened.”); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 97TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS
ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1980, at 379 (1981) [hereinafter 1980 HUMAN RIGHTS
REPORTS] (“In a number of instances, church property has been the target of attacks carried
out by assailants who have not been identified.”); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 96TH CONG.,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1979, at 274-75 (1980) (“[The
Catholic Church’s defense of human rights] has resulted in occasional tensions with the Government, but sporadic harassment of the Church’s social action programs has not spilled over
into the area of religious teaching and worship.”).
Notably, the Catholic Church occasionally responded to the government’s mistreatment of Church officials and personnel by using, or at least considering using, its spiritual
authority against those government employees involved. In 1976, for example, the Church
excommunicated a government official and several security agents involved in the hostile reception given to three Chilean bishops upon their return to Chile. See LERNOUX, NOTES, supra,
at 18; cf. Telegram from U.S. Embassy in Santiago to U.S. Dep’t of State 1 (Jan. 1976) (copy
on file with author) (reporting that a meeting of the Chilean Episcopal Conference “considered [the] possibility of Church excommunication of people implicated in torture”).
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services activities continued unabated.159
In addition to taking action against vocal opposition groups, the
military government also continued its practice of cracking down on
“pseudo-religious organizations” that allegedly acted as “servants of
international communism.”160 For example, in July 1976, the government “briefly detained several members of the ‘Light and Love’
mission.”161 Responding to the regime’s actions, the United States
Embassy in Santiago observed that “[w]hile in general the [government of Chile] has not restricted religious freedoms, it apparently
views certain sects as not qualifying as full fledged [sic] religious
groups and treats them differently.”162
The third phase of the government’s treatment of opposition religious organizations occurred between 1982 and the return of democracy in 1990. During this period, the Catholic Church and other
religious organizations sought a less confrontational relationship
with the regime and, in response to the 1980 plebiscite that ratified
continued military rule under the Constitution of 1980, reduced
their calls for a return to civilian rule.163 However, they continued to
both support the Vicariate of Solidarity and condemn the regime’s
human rights abuses.164 Also, with the beginning of massive antiPinochet political protests in May 1983, individual clergymen increasingly participated in and organized street demonstrations
against the regime.165
Despite the churches’ efforts to improve relations with Pinochet’s government, the military continued to interpret the Vicariate’s
activities, public criticisms of torture and human rights violations,
and the participation of clergymen in demonstrations against the regime as “acts of hostility to be answered in kind.”166 Government
forces accordingly continued to denounce the alleged incompetence
of religious authorities and to intimidate and harass Vicariate em-

159. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 66-67; see also SMITH, supra note 15, at 319.
160. Telegram from U.S. Embassy in Santiago to U.S. Dep’t of State 2 (Aug. 1976)
(copy on file with author).
161. See id.
162. Id.
163. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 115.
164. See id.
165. See id. at 117-19; LOWDEN, supra note 15, at 107.
166. FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 117.
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ployees and programs.167 In addition, government forces arrested, assaulted, expelled, or killed an undetermined number of clergymen
who participated in and organized demonstrations against the regime
and attacked church facilities where demonstrators planned their actions or sought to find refuge.168 This third phase in the govern167. See id. at 116-17, 130; see also LOWDEN, supra note 15, at 111 (killing of Vicariate
staff member), 112-15 (government accused Catholic Church of inciting violence); Smith,
Chile, supra note 15, at 177 (attacks on Church and its supporters included “the reappearance
of charges of subversion against church groups . . . , more expulsions of foreign clergy, and a
return to police harassment and arrest of [V]icariate and [local lay] leaders”); Grace Gibson &
Ana Pena, Vicaria (II): La Prueba de la Blancura, QUÉ PASA, Mar. 2, 1989, at 19-20, available in DIALOG, Info-South File (accusations that Vicariate provided aid to assassin of Chilean policeman, was associated with leftist terrorist groups, and had disreputable financial dealings); Bradley Graham, Chilean Oppressed Turn to Vicariate, WASH. POST, May 2, 1987, at
G12 (prosecution of lawyer and doctor on Vicariate’s staff for acting as “accomplices after the
fact” to killing of policeman by gunman to whom Vicariate personnel provided refuge and
medical treatment); cf. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 100TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1987, at 420-21 (1988) [hereinafter 1987 HUMAN RIGHTS
REPORTS] (Vicariate investigated by military prosecutor, Vicariate employees threatened, and
unidentified parties broke into and/or searched church offices and premises); U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, 100TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1986, at 437
(1987) [hereinafter 1986 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS] (anonymous attacks against property and
officials of Catholic Church included attempted assassination of two bishops and threats
against lay workers); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 99TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1985, at 457 (1986) [hereinafter 1985 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS]
(Catholic Church attacked by unidentified groups, which bombed churches, sprayed churches
with gunfire, kidnapped and mistreated lay workers, broke into church property and files, and
threatened church officials or priests); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 99TH CONG., COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1984, at 462, 466 (1985) [hereinafter 1984
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS] (“[T]he Government prohibited media coverage of a pastoral
statement by the Archbishop of Santiago . . . . Other steps were taken throughout the country
to limit the expression of the Catholic church . . . . Some [Catholic] church activists and human rights lawyers have occasionally been threatened anonymously.”); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
98TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1983, at 504 (1984)
[hereinafter 1983 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS] (“Some [Catholic] Church activists and human
rights lawyers were anonymously threatened during 1983, but such incidents apparently declined toward the end of 1983.”).
168. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 117, 121-22, 130; LOWDEN, supra note 15,
at 108-09; see also 1986 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 167, at 437 (three French
priests expelled, other clergymen detained, and two U.S. priests had residence permits limited);
1985 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 167, at 457 (“[S]everal [foreign priests] were detained for short periods for involvement in protest demonstrations against the Government.”);
1984 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 167, at 462-63 (one French national priest shot
during demonstration, and one U.S. priest expelled for involvement in anti-torture campaign);
100 Priests and Nuns Arrested in Chile, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 24, 1986, at B2 (“More than
100 priests, nuns and church workers were arrested after Chilean police broke up a protest
march.”); Chile Tightens Screws Again by Booting 3 French Priests, CHICAGO TRIB., Sept. 11,
1986, at C5 (expulsion of three French priests for possessing political literature); Jackson
Diehl, Church Leader Assails Chile’s State of Seige, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1984, at A1(“In the

1222

THU-FIN.DOC

1185]

9/25/00 10:36 PM

Religious Liberty in Chile

ment’s treatment of perceived opposition from religious groups thus
essentially combined the individualized repression of the first phase
with the organization-oriented intimidation of the second.
The Pinochet regime’s political views and intolerance of dissent
thus caused it to perceive the religiously based beliefs and activities of
both individual clergymen and religious organizations as adversarial
to the regime. The beliefs and activities at issue generally originated
from liberation theology and other more moderate variants of social
Catholicism that viewed the protection of human rights and democratic government as part of a religion’s parochial duty. Viewing such
beliefs as byproducts of Marxism, the military engaged in several
phases of repression that, at the very least, inhibited the ability of
hundreds of clergymen and several religious organizations (especially
the Catholic Church) to maintain and manifest their beliefs, contrary
to the guarantees provided by the national juridical regime.
(2) Government treatment of perceived nonopposition groups.
The Pinochet regime actively worked to cultivate support among
those religious groups that it perceived as being supportive of the regime’s actions and goals. To be sure, there were many groups, principally among the Pentecostal and historic Protestant churches, but
also among conservative Catholics, that strongly believed in and defended the military’s actions and policies. For example, shortly after
the 1973 coup, a group of thirty-two relatively prominent Protestant
and Pentecostal churches published a statement supporting the

last week, the government has banned from Chile a priest heading the church’s human rights
organization and has censored [Santiago Archbishop Juan Francisco] Fresno’s last two public
statements.”); Diehl, supra note 149, at A27 (Catholic priest killed by police during 1984
demonstration became “militant priest-martyr” in local community); Bradley Graham, Chile
Shifts on Priests’ Ouster, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1986, at A29 (government reconsidered order
to expel three French priests after Chilean Cardinal “warned that the expulsions would have a
disruptive effect on the country”); Tim Johnson, Charges of Violence Rock Chile Government,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Aug. 27, 1985, at 9, 9 (“The Roman Catholic Church asked
Chile’s Supreme Court last week to name a special prosecuting judge to investigate 72 cases in
which unidentified armed squads have kidnapped and wounded opposition and religious activists.”); Stephen Kinzer, Church in Chile Doesn’t Just Pray for Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20,
1983, at E3 (progovernment forces responsible for “beatings and arrests of [Catholic] sacristans and chapel custodians” as well as vandalizing two Catholic radio stations); Pinochet Ignores
Church Plea, Orders More Raids on Slums, CHICAGO TRIB., May 10, 1986, at C9 (police confiscated six videocassettes “for a documentary about everyday life there” from Catholic priest);
Priests Held in Chilean Siege, CHICAGO TRIB., Sept. 9, 1986, at C14 (security forces raided
religious residence and arrested six Catholic priests, including two United States and three
French citizens).

1223

THU-FIN.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9/25/00 10:36 PM

[2000

military’s actions in exterminating Marxism,169 and several thousand
Pentecostals attended a Te Deum religious service held for General
Pinochet and his government in conjunction with the dedication of a
new Pentecostal cathedral in Santiago.170 Similarly, a conservative
Catholic group called the Society for the Defense of Tradition, Family, and Property (TFP) praised the coup and criticized those who
opposed military rule.171
169. See Declaración de la Iglesia Evangélica de Chile (Dec. 13, 1974), reprinted in LA
IGLESIA Y LA JUNTA MILITAR DE CHILE (DOCUMENTOS), supra note 15, at 100-03; see also
Situación de las iglesias evangélicas de Chile, supra note 47, at 107-26 (analyzing and criticizing
the statement published by the Pentecostal groups); COSTAS, supra note 56, at 145-47 (discussing the origin of the Pentecostal statement and advancing the idea that it resulted from
government pressure). In 1987, United States television evangelist Jimmy Swaggart visited
Chile and vocally supported Pinochet, asking “his audience in Santiago to ‘pray for General
Pinochet and his beautiful wife.’” Richard N. Ostling, Offering the Hope of Heaven, TIME,
Mar. 16, 1987, at 69, 69.
By far the most disturbing report of Protestant support for the regime involved
claims by Catholic officials and human rights groups that Chilean security forces established a
prison camp and torture center at Colonia Dignidad, an agricultural and religious commune
founded in southern Chile during the early 1960s by evangelical minister Paul Schaeffer and
300 of his German immigrant followers. See Joshua Hammer, Hell on Earth, NEWSWEEK, June
30, 1997, at 14 (Atlantic ed.), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NWEEK File; Charles A.
Krause, Colonia Dignidad: Nobody Comes, Nobody Goes, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1980, at A1. In
addition to requiring strict (and apparently forced) religious devotion from his followers,
Schaefer supposedly “developed close ties to Gen. Manuel Contreras, director of the junta’s
intelligence service, . . . and allegedly turned his colony over to Contreras to detain leftist prisoners.” Hammer, supra, at 14. Though the government repeatedly denied these claims, “[i]n
1977 a government informant named Juan Muñoz admitted in a church investigation of human-rights abuses that he had helped ‘disappear’ captives at Colonia Dignidad.” Id. In return
for his support for Pinochet, Schaeffer allegedly received aid from right wing politicians and
police as well as a 14-seat Cessna airplane and weapons from the Chilean military. See id.
170. See SMITH, supra note 15, at 312-13 n.7. Recently, several scholars have emphasized
(1) that in the 1960s and 1970s, Pentecostal pastors were much less inclined to discuss social
issues in their sermons than were other Protestant pastors, see MARTIN, supra note 57, at 23738 (presenting the findings of researchers Frederick Turner and LaLive D’Epinay), and (2) the
difference between Protestant religious organizations’ support of Pinochet and the pro-Allende
sentiments of most Protestant individuals, noting that individual Protestants had voted for
Allende while most Protestant (primarily Pentecostal) leaders had opposed Allende and backed
Pinochet. See id. at 238 (discussing Johannes Tennekes “fundamental conclusion . . . that
[Pentecostal] pastors held—or struck—much more right-wing attitudes after the coup than
was consonant with the views of their flocks prior to the coup”); Edward L. Cleary & Juan
Sepúlveda, Chilean Pentecostalism: Coming of Age, in POWER, POLITICS, AND PENTECOSTALS
IN LATIN AMERICA 104 (Edward L. Cleary & Hannah W. Stewart-Gambino eds., 1997)
(summarizing the observations of Renato Poblete, a Jesuit sociologist, regarding Pentecostal
attitudes toward Allende). Also, at least two commentators have argued that Protestant
churches’ support for Pinochet “was not principally because of any alleged political affinity but
rather for reasons relating to religious power.” Id. at 105.
171. See SMITH, supra note 15, at 338-39.
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To bolster its legitimacy and create a counterbalance to the criticisms of the opposition religious groups, the Pinochet government
actively “courted various Protestant sects”172 and sought to cement
its support among “friendly” and noncritical churches by granting
them special privileges and rewards. For example, the government
“for the first time opened the ranks of the military to non-Catholic
evangelization and extended social benefits to Protestant ministers
and their families that had been reserved to Catholic personnel in the
past.”173 In the early 1970s, the regime also assisted the Methodist
Pentecostal Church, Chile’s most numerous non-Catholic religious
group,174 by providing subsidies for the completion of the church’s
new cathedral, attending the cathedral’s dedication, naming the cathedral as the site of the county’s annual thanksgiving (acción de gracias) services, and asking the cathedral’s pastor to serve as minister of
religion.175 Similarly, the regime granted the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints (“LDS Church” or “Mormons”)—which government officials publicly praised for its nonpolitical focus176—a substantial increase in the number of visas given to foreign (primarily
American) missionaries beginning in the late 1970s177 and presented
church leaders in 1976 with a special medallion symbolizing the
church’s contribution to the “social and spiritual welfare of Chile.”178
172. Telegram October 1975, supra note 149, at 2.
173. See Stewart-Gambino, supra note 15, at 27; see also MARTIN, supra note 57, at 242.
174. See Stewart-Gambino, supra note 15, at 27.
175. See SMITH, supra note 15, at 312-13 n.71 (citation omitted); DAVID STOLL, IS
LATIN AMERICA TURNING PROTESTANT? 316 (1990) (citing Chile’s Junta Courts the OnceSpurned Protestants, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Sept. 4, 1981, at 59). Though the cathedral’s pastor declined Pinochet’s invitation to serve as minister of religion, he and other evangelical leaders consented to form a “Council of Pastors,” YAÑEZ, supra note 15, at 123 (discussing the
creation of the “Consejo de Pastores”), that “administer[ed] an official carnet system, to regulate the access of pastors to government institutions—the kind of system many evangelicals accuse communist regimes of using to persecute the church.” STOLL, supra, at 316 (footnote
omitted).
176. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 177.
177. Cf. RODOLFO ACEVEDO A., LOS MORMONES EN CHILE 66 (1989) (stating that
between 1977 and 1979 the LDS Church divided two existing missions to create a total of five
missions in Chile, producing a need for several hundred additional missionaries).
178. ACEVEDO, supra note 177, at 61 n.2 (quoting Gobierno Honró a Mormones,
REVISTA DEL COBRE, June 26, 1976, at 4) (“bienestar social y espiritual de Chile”). Presentation of the medallion occurred during a visit of Chilean government representatives to the LDS
Church’s headquarters. See id. During a public speaking tour throughout Latin America in
1977, LDS leaders traveled to Santiago and met with General Pinochet and presented him
with copies of the church’s scriptural works and other LDS literature. See Dell Van Ord, Love,
Respect and Emotion End Area Conference Series, CHURCH NEWS, Mar. 12, 1977, at 3, 13.
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The Pinochet regime thus sought to cultivate and maintain good
relations with those religious groups that supported it—or at least
did not vocally oppose it—by providing them special privileges. Such
politically based favoritism violated the government’s constitutional
duty to foster religious freedom by treating religious groups equally.
(3) Conclusion. As the above subsections demonstrate, the Pinochet regime treated religious groups differently according to the
manner in which it perceived their support for the regime’s policies
and practices. Those individuals and groups that actively or apparently opposed the government were subjected to varying degrees of
persecution, while those that actively supported the regime or refrained from criticizing it received special privileges. By persecuting
and favoring individuals and groups because of their religious beliefs,
the Pinochet regime abrogated its obligation to respect religious liberty.
c. Popular perception and treatment of religious groups, doctrines,
and practices. Throughout the Pinochet era, popular perception and
treatment of religious groups, doctrines, and practices depended
primarily on political rather than religious factors. Like the military
government, Chilean society largely based its treatment of different
religious groups on the manner in which they apparently supported
or opposed the regime’s policies and actions. Conservative elements
of society, for example, both criticized the Catholic and historic
Protestant churches that opposed the regime and engaged in acts of
terrorism (including bombings, assassinations, death threats, assaults,
etc.) against individual clergymen who belonged to those religions.179 Conversely, liberal elements also criticized and engaged in

179. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 68-69; cf. 1987 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS,
supra note 167, at 420-21 (unidentified parties broke into and/or searched numerous Catholic offices and premises); 1986 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 167, at 437 (anonymous
attacks against property and officials of Catholic Church included attempted assassination of
two bishops and threats against lay workers); 1985 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 167,
at 457 (Catholic Church attacked by unidentified groups that bombed churches, sprayed
churches with gunfire, kidnapped and mistreated lay workers, broke into church property and
files, and threatened church officials or priests); 1984 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note
167, at 446 (“Some [Catholic] church activists and human rights lawyers have occasionally
been threatened anonymously.”); 1983 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 167, at 504
(“Some [Catholic] Church activists and human rights lawyers were anonymously threatened
during 1983, but such incidents apparently declined toward the end of 1983.”); 1982 HUMAN
RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 158, at 441 (“Some [Catholic] Church activists and human
rights lawyers have during 1982 been anonymously threatened.”); 1981 HUMAN RIGHTS
REPORTS, supra note 158, at 376 (“[Catholic] Church activists and human rights lawyers have
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acts of terrorism against religious groups that actively supported the
regime or appeared to do so due to their silence about the military’s
practices and policies.180
Such ideologically generated perception and treatment of religious groups had several significant consequences on the development of religious liberty. First, it generated and intensified the same
sort of intradenominational fragmentation that had plagued various
religions (particularly the Catholic Church) prior to 1973.181 The
Catholic Church, for example, remained fragmented along liberal,
moderate, and conservative lines.182 More seriously, the Lutheran
Church formally split into two churches, one conservative and promilitary, the other liberal and antimilitary.183 Second, it created interdenominational tensions between religious groups that opposed
and supported the dictatorship, respectively. As mentioned earlier,
such tensions caused the dissolution of COPACHI in 1975, as the
Baptist and Greek Orthodox churches withdrew from the alliance after several Catholic priests and nuns aided members of a Marxist terrorist group.184 Third, and most important, it created an intolerant
atmosphere that discouraged the free practice and expression of religious belief.
To a much lesser extent, interdenominational tensions also arose
in response to doctrinally based disputes and the rapid growth of

been anonymously threatened.”); 1980 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 158, at 379
(“In a number of instances, church property has been the target of attacks carried out by assailants who have not been identified or apprehended.”).
180. See William R. Long, Soul Men, L.A. TIMES MAG., June 20, 1993, at 18, 18 (stating
that between the early 1980s and 1993 leftist terrorists set off approximately “300 explosions
and fires” at LDS chapels throughout Chile); see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 101ST CONG.,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1989, at 505 (1990) (“The Mormon
Church continued to be a target of leftwing terrorist groups . . . ; Mormon churches were
bombed, but there were no reported injuries.”); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 101ST CONG.,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1988, at 493 (1989) (“The Mormon
Church continued to be a target of leftwing terrorist groups.”); 1987 HUMAN RIGHTS
REPORTS, supra note 167, at 420 (“The Mormon church continued to be a target of leftwing
terrorist groups, but with fewer bombings than in 1986.); 1986 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS,
supra note 167, at 437 (“[T]here were at least 17 bombings against the Mormon
Church . . . .”); 1985 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 167, at 457 (“During 1985,
there were at least fourteen bomb attacks against the Mormon Church, particularly against
church buildings.”).
181. For a discussion of the pre-1973 fragmentation of religions, see supra Part II.A.
182. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 68-69.
183. See Situación de las Iglesias Evangélicas de Chile, supra note 47, at 107.
184. See SMITH, supra note 15, at 318.
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such non-Catholic groups as the Pentecostals and the Mormons. In
the mid-1980s, for example, there occurred a “notable cooling of
relations between Catholics and many Pentecostal churches”185 due
to the rise and success of “sectarian proselytism” by Pentecostal
groups.186 Similarly, in the early 1980s, both Catholic officials and
various Protestant churches expressed their alarm at the rapid growth
of Mormonism in Chile.187 A group of Protestant pastors even sent a
letter to President Pinochet, accusing the LDS Church of being nonChristian and using its economic resources to attract converts.188
Though not as publicly divisive as ideological differences, such negative views of other religions contributed to the prevailing atmosphere
of intolerance.
3. Conclusion: The development of religious liberty under the Pinochet
regime
As demonstrated by the previous discussion of the development
of Chile’s national juridical framework under Pinochet, the Pinochet
regime’s perception and treatment of religious groups, and popular
perceptions and treatment of religious groups, the Pinochet period
was a contradictory yet significant era in the evolution of religious
liberty in Chile. On one hand, though the constitutional regime
regulating religious liberty remained essentially constant, the enactment of national legislation and ratification of international instruments containing provisions relating to specific aspects of religious
liberty provided religious freedom with unprecedented scope and
depth. However, Chilean society remained unable to fully enjoy its
religious rights due to the de facto obstacles and spirit of religious intolerance generated by the military government’s practice of using its
emergency powers to suspend all nonderogable religious rights and
the tendency of both the government and public to judge and mistreat religious groups according to political ideas and criteria.
The Pinochet period was thus characterized by contradictory developments that worked to simultaneously further and restrict reli185. Cleary & Sepúlveda, supra note 170, at 113.
186. Id. (quoting KATHERINE GILFEATHER O’BRIEN, EL ROL DE ECUMENISMO
PROTESTANTE COMO POSIBLE SOLUCIÓN AL IMPASSE EN LAS RELACIONES ENTRE LA IGLESIA
CATÓLICA Y LA COMUNIDAD PENTECOSTAL (1992)).
187. See ACEVEDO, supra note 177, at 72.
188. See id. (citing Se Desata Polémica Religiosa, LAS ÚLTIMAS NOTICIAS, May 30, 1982,
at 20).
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gious freedom. In light of this fact, the true significance of the Pinochet era with respect to religious liberty arguably lies in its development of a national juridical regime that provided more numerous
and better defined boundaries outlining the scope of religious liberty. If nothing else, this development would prove to be of much
value to the continued evolution of religious liberty in post-Pinochet
Chile.
B. The Evolution of Religious Liberty in the Post-Pinochet Era: 19902000
The consolidation of civilian democracy in the post-Pinochet era
has fostered an important process of normalization in the development of religious liberty in Chile. The return of civilian rule eliminated the political tensions responsible for restricting the availability
and practice of religious freedom during the Pinochet period and
rendered the government more responsive to the needs of minority
religions. Moreover, the consolidation of democracy has allowed the
de jure protections established during the Pinochet regime to expand, resulting most notably in the recent enactment of legislation
affirming religious liberty and providing equal juridical standing to
all religious organizations. Nevertheless, religious liberty has not
flourished in practice due to government discrimination against certain religious groups and the growth of interdenominational rivalries
and related popular prejudices. Religious freedom, therefore, has
continued to be characterized by contradictory developments that
have simultaneously strengthened and weakened it.
1. Background: The consolidation of protected democracy and the postPinochet era
Since returning to civilian rule in March 1990, Chile has experienced considerable economic and political development and stability.189 Though subject to the Constitution of 1980’s restrictive regi189. See generally FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 159; LOIS HECHT OPPENHEIM,
POLITICS IN CHILE: DEMOCRACY, AUTHORITARIANISM, AND THE SEARCH FOR
DEVELOPMENT 195-275 (2d ed. 1999). The country’s political stability arguably is perhaps
best evidenced by the fact that (1) the anti-Pinochet coalition of center-left political parties has
won all three presidential elections held since 1989, see Clifford Krauss, Chilean Socialist Narrowly Elected to the Presidency, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2000, at A1, and (2) the coalition candidate, Ricardo Lagos, who recently won the 1999-2000 presidential election, is a former member of the Chilean Socialist Party. See id.
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men of protected democracy190 and General Pinochet’s continued
involvement in the national government,191 Chilean democracy has
achieved a high degree of consolidation “in all sectors of society except the military.”192 Endeavors to complete full consolidation have
failed due to the civilian government’s inability to reduce, if not
eliminate, the military’s political roles, subject the military to civilian
control, hold military officials responsible for human rights abuses
committed under the Pinochet regime, and remove all of the Constitution of 1980’s antidemocratic limitations on civilian democracy.193
Moreover, such endeavors have generated recurring civil-military
conflicts.194 Though civil-military relations improved during the mid1990s, British authorities’ decision in 1998 to arrest General Pinochet while in the United Kingdom for possible extradition to Spain
to face human rights charges rekindled tensions between the military
and civilians.195 “Most observers,” however, “[have opined] that only
hard-line military elements would welcome a coup at this point, and
that they are unlikely to move on their own.”196

190. For information on protected democracy and/or the protected democracy-related
provisions of the Constitution of 1980, see supra notes 71 and 72, respectively.
191. Under the Constitution of 1980, see Sigler et al., supra note 76, at 33-34, Pinochet
served as head of the armed forces until 1998 and has served since then as a senator-for-life. See
Clifford Krauss, Pinochet, at Home in Chile: A Real Nowhere Man, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2000,
at A12.
192. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 159. For an intriguing discussion of the triumphs and challenges of consolidation of democracy in Chile, see OPPENHEIM, supra note
189, at 195-238.
193. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 189, at 200-19.
194. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 166-68; OPPENHEIM, supra note 189, at
217-19.
195. See, e.g., Joseph Contreras, Awaiting Justice, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 18, 1999, at 36 (Atlantic ed.), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NWEEK File; Marc Cooper, Ballots and Bones,
MOTHER JONES, Mar. 1, 2000, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, MAGS File; Isabel Hilton,
As Chilean Television Shows the Verdict, Sonia Weeps with Relief: Someone Finally Is Saying “No”
to Pinochet, NEW STATESMAN, Nov. 27, 1998, at 7, 7-8; Brook Larmer, Undying Memory,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 18, 1998, at 31 (Atlantic ed.), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NWEEK
File. Though British authorities initially decided to extradite Pinochet to Spain, see Marjorie
Miller, Pinochet May Be Extradited to Spain to Stand Trial, British Judge Rules, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 1999, at A8, an appellate body ruled in January 2000 against extradition due to Pinochet’s poor health. See Marjorie Miller, Britain Says Pinochet Sick, Won’t Be Tried, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 12, 2000, at A1.
196. FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 159 (footnote omitted).
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2. Anlaysis: Religious liberty in post-Pinochet Chile
Chile entered the post-Pinochet era with a relatively well-defined
juridical regime governing religious freedom, which was limited as a
matter of de facto reality by governmental and popular attitudes that
promoted unequal treatment of religious groups and interdenominational rivalry.197 An analysis of the same three factors examined in
Part III.A.2—the development of Chile’s national juridical framework, the Chilean government’s perception and treatment of religious groups, doctrines, and practices, and the popular perception
and treatment of religious groups, doctrines, and practices—reveals
that religious liberty has attained an unprecedented level of protection and acceptance in the post-Pinochet period. The return to and
consolidation of democracy has allowed Chile to further develop its
religious liberty-related juridical protections and provisions, while
diffusing the political tensions responsible for restricting the
availability and practice of religious freedom during the Pinochet
period. At the same time, however, religious liberty has struggled
against several factors promoting de facto religious intolerance,
particularly the government’s continued practice of granting
preferential treatment to certain religious groups and the rise of
popular prejudices stemming from interdenominational rivalries.
a. Juridical developments relating to freedom of religion. Part
III.A.2.a demonstrated that upon entering the post-Pinochet period,
Chile possessed a solid juridical regime that defined the scope of religious liberty in relation to many areas of the law and society. The
consolidation of democracy in the post-Pinochet period has reinforced these protections by extending them to additional areas of the
law.
(1) Constitutional provisions. The Constitution of 1980 has
continued to govern Chile since the re-establishment of civilian rule
in 1990. As a result, the constitutional regime has maintained the
same guarantees for, and limitations on, religious liberty that existed
during the last decade of Pinochet’s dictatorship.198
(2) Legislative and administrative provisions. As a general rule,
the post-Pinochet legislative regime has maintained most of the religious freedom-related provisions enacted by the military govern197. See supra Part III.A.2.
198. For a brief discussion of the Constitution of 1980’s provisions regarding religious
liberty, see supra notes 100-104 and accompanying text.
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ment. In some cases, the existing law was left unaltered;199 in others,
a new law reproduced the provisions originally enacted by the Pinochet regime.200 Chile’s juridical regime has thus continued to recognize such provisions as the illegality of conditioning employment on
religious belief,201 the inability of community organizations to discriminate against their members on religious grounds,202 the illegality
of proselyting in community organizations and cooperative societies,203 the obligation of public schools to teach courses on religion
and to treat such courses as electives for graduation purposes,204 the
right of parents of children who attend a private school owned and
operated by a religious organization to request that their children
not be educated according to the sponsoring religion’s beliefs,205 the
right of “religious persons” to receive exemptions from compulsory
military service,206 and the government’s obligation to provide prisoners with religious activities.207
Under civilian rule, both the national government and local municipalities have enacted laws relating to religious freedom. Though
these laws differ in their potential to affect religious liberty’s continued development, all further define the scope of protections afforded
to and by religious liberty by addressing such issues as discussed below.
(i) Dissemination of religious belief. Since the early 1990’s,
numerous municipalities throughout Chile have passed noise ordinances that potentially limit the ability of religious groups to express
their beliefs in public. In relevant part, the ordinances prohibit the
use of megaphones to transmit any type of political, commercial, or

199. See, e.g., Ley No. 18,620, 27 de mayo de 1987, D.O., 6 de julio de 1987; Decreto
No. 924, 12 de septiembre de 1983, D.O., 7 de enero de 1984.
200. Compare, e.g., Ley No. 18,893, 26 de diciembre de 1989, D.O., 30 de diciembre de
1989, with Ley No. 19,418, 25 de septiembre de 1995, D.O., 9 de octubre de 1995; see also
Decreto No. 58, 9 de enero de 1997, D.O., 20 de marzo de 1997.
201. See Ley No. 18,620, art. 2.
202. See Ley No. 19,418, art. 3; see also Decreto No. 58, art. 3.
203. See Ley No. 19,418, art. 3; see also Decreto No. 58, art. 3.
204. See Decreto No. 76, 7 de mayo de 1985, D.O., 15 de mayo de 1985, art. 2.
205. See Decreto No. 924, art. 5.
206. See Decreto No. 244, 1 de marzo de 1979, D.O., 3 de mayo de 1979, art. 43(6).
207. Compare Decreto-Ley No. 2859, 12 de septiembre de 1979, D.O., 16 de septiembre de 1979, art. 8(2), with Decreto No. 1771, 30 de diciembre de 1992, D.O., 9 de febrero
de 1993, art. 9(c); see also Decreto No. 518, 22 de mayo de 1998, D.O., 21 de agosto de
1998, art. 10.
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religious message without express authorization from the municipality.208 Some ordinances also forbid the playing of music of any variety
in public streets without proper authorization from the municipality
and proscribe the use of amplifiers and production of “any sound
that disrupts the tranquility, calmness, or rest of a neighborhood, at
any time of day.”209 Pentecostal groups have protested these ordinances, fearing that they will be enforced to prevent them from engaging in public preaching and musical processions.210 To date, however, the ordinances have not been enforced in that way.211
(ii) Juridical personality of religious organizations. By far
the most important post-Pinochet development concerning religious
liberty involved the enactment of legislation that, in addition to reaffirming the existing juridical regime and guarantees, granted all religious organizations equal juridical standing.212 The movement to
pass such a law began in 1992 with the creation of an Advisory
Commission for the Organization and Functioning of Pentecostal
Entities, which was charged in part with determining the type of legal standing that should be granted to Chile’s numerous Pentecostal
denominations.213 In 1996, President Aylwin’s administration responded to Pentecostal groups’ “complaints of discrimination” by
submitting to Congress a bill “providing for legal equality of all
religions.”214 After passing the House of Deputies, the bill failed in
the Senate due to pressure from the Catholic Church,215 which
feared that the bill would “eliminate[] [the Church’s] historic rights
and expose[] its statutes to the undulations of politics,”216 and
208. See, e.g., Decreto No. 194, 7 de julio de 1999, D.O., 11 de agosto de 1999, art. 32;
Decreto No. 650, 10 de junio de 1998, D.O., 21 de julio de 1998, art. 35; Decreto No. 1849,
30 de octubre de 1997, D.O., 14 de noviembre de 1997, art. 33; Decreto No. 214, 28 de enero de 1993, D.O., 11 de febrero de 1993, art. 36; Decreto No. 431, 5 de junio de 1991,
D.O., 28 de junio de 1991, art. 2(c).
209. Decreto No. 214, art. 36 (“todo sonido que altere la tranquilidad, quietud o reposo
del vecindario, a cualquier hora del día”).
210. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 104TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 1995, at 358 (1996) [hereinafter 1995 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS]; see also
Poblete, supra note 15, at 233-34.
211. See Poblete, supra note 15, at 234.
212. See Ley No. 19638, 1 de octubre de 1999, D.O., 14 de octubre de 1999. For a
comprehensive analysis of the law, see infra Part IV.A. Also, see Appendix for the full text of
the law in Spanish and English.
213. See Decreto No. 332, 1 de junio de 1992, D.O., 6 de junio de 1992, art. 2.
214. Poblete, supra note 15, at 233.
215. See Pedro C. Moreno, Evangelical Churches, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND
EVANGELIZATION, supra note 15, at 53.
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expose[] its statutes to the undulations of politics,”216 and “provide a
legal base for demands from Evangelical and Protestant faiths to participate in official public acts . . . [and] be given positions within
Chile’s armed services to minister to the needs of their faithful.”217 In
October 1999, however, the government succeeded in passing the
law (commonly called the Law of Worship, or ley de cultos),218 overcoming Catholic objections by altering it so as to “respect[] Catholic
Church cannon [sic] law.”219
(iii) Prisoners’ rights. In addition to reaffirming previous
provisions requiring penal institutions to provide religious assistance
and activities,220 two decrees specifically guaranteed inmates’ freedom

216. Parlamento Aprobó Ley que Establece Igualdad Jurídica de Iglesias, Spanish Newswire
Services, July 16, 1999, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Efenew File [hereinafter Parlamento Aprobó] (“eliminaba sus derechos históricos y exponía sus estatutos a los vaivenes de la
política”). In a more comprehensive discussion regarding the bill, the Catholic Church stated
that it opposed the bill because: (1) although the Church would retain public legal standing,
the law granting such standing would remain exposed to future modifications; (2) the bill
failed to recognize that the Church’s statutes are the product of international agreements between Chile and the Vatican; (3) the bill failed to address Church canon law, thereby subjugating canon law to any noncanonical law and complicating the Church’s ministry; (4) under the
bill, the Church would lose the benefit of 150 years worth of judicial and administrative jurisprudence; and (5) the bill would permit special judicial proceedings to dissolve a religious organization. See Puntos de Discordia, LA TERCERA, July 7, 1998 (visited May 19, 2000)
<http://www.tercera.cl/diario/1998/07/07/2.html>; see also Arzobispo Errázuriz Define
Postura en la Ley de Culto, LA TERCERA, July 6, 1999 (visited May 11, 2000)
<http://www.tercera.cl/diario/1999/07/06/06.03.3a.POL.IGLESIA.html>; Reparo de
Católicos Hacia Ley Cultos, LA TERCERA, July 7, 1998 (visited May 11, 2000)
<http://www.tercera.cl/diario/1998/07/07/2.html>.
217. Current Events Briefs, CHIPS, July 8, 1999, available in 1999 WL 10738842. Pentecostals, however, believed that the Church’s opposition to the law arose principally from a
fear of losing political power. See Javier Ortega, Héctor Darío Olivares: “Sabe que Perderá Poder
Político,” LA TERCERA, Nov. 3, 1997 (visited May 19, 2000) <http://www.tercera.cl/diario/
1997/11/03/index.html >.
218. See Poblete, supra note 15, at 233.
219. See Current Events Briefs, CHIPS, July 10, 1999, available in1999 WL 10738853;
see also Parlamento Aprobó, supra note 216; Gabriela de la Maza, Las Movidas que Evitaron la
“Guerra Santa”, LA TERCERA, July 8, 1999 (visited May 11, 2000) <http://www.tercera.cl
/diario/07/08/08.10.3a.CRO.GUERRA.SANTA.html>. Even with the proposed law’s recognition of canon law, however, some Catholic opposition to the project remained.
Archbishop Francisco Javier Errázuriz, for example, desired that the new law be amended “so
that satanic groups and other sects can’t take advantage of [it] . . . .” See Current Events Briefs,
supra. Similarly, Catholic spokesman Enrique Palet classified the law as “the responsibility of
the legislators and does not count with the official support of Catholic Church authorities.”
Current Events Briefs, supra note 217.
220. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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of religion.221 The later of the two decrees also stipulated that all
norms established by that regulation should be applied impartially
without differentiating between inmates due to religious belief.222
Together, these laws have added significant breadth and boundaries to Chile’s juridical regime governing religious liberty, particularly with respect to the juridical personality of religious organizations and the protection of prisoners’ rights. The 1999 Law of
Worship, however, ranks as the most significant, promising, and potentially far-reaching law that has been enacted to date. At the very
least, the Law of Worship may be considered the most significant development in Chile’s legal regime since the Constitution of 1925
first guaranteed the freedom of religion and separation of church and
state.
(3) International legal norms. During the first year of civilian
rule, Chile ratified the American Convention on Human Rights
(ACHR),223 an international instrument containing several provisions
that concern religious liberty. In many respects, the pertinent ACHR
terms closely mirror those established in the ICCPR and ICESCR,
both of which became binding on Chile under the Pinochet regime.224 All three instruments, for example, prohibit discrimination
on the basis of religion225 and permit parents to provide for the
moral and religious education of their children.226 Also, numerous
other ACHR provisions establish the same rights and freedoms provided in the ICCPR, including the right to freedom of conscience
and religion,227 the freedom to maintain and change belief,228 the
freedom to manifest belief subject to constraints imposed by law,229
221. See Decreto No. 518, 22 de mayo de 1998, D.O., 21 de agosto de 1998, art. 6; Decreto No. 1171, 30 de diciembre de 1992, D.O., 9 de febrero de 1993, art. 6.
222. See Decreto No. 518 art. 5.
223. See Decreto No. 873, 23 de agosto de 1990, D.O., 5 de enero de 1991.
224. See supra Part III.A.2.a.(3).
225. See American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969,
art. 1(1), 1144 U.N.T.S. 143, 145 (entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter ACHR];
ICCPR, supra note 96, at 173, art. 2(1).
226. See ACHR, supra note 225, at 148, art. 12(4); ICCPR, supra note 96, at 178, art.
18(4); ICESCR, supra note 130, at 8, art. 13(3).
227. Compare ACHR, supra note 225, at 148, art. 12(1), with ICCPR, supra note 96, at
178, art. 18(1).
228. Compare ACHR, supra note 225, at 148, art. 12(2), with ICCPR, supra note 96, at
178, art. 18(2).
229. Compare ACHR, supra note 225, at 148, art. 12(3), with ICCPR, supra note 96, at
178, art. 18(3).
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the freedom of thought and expression,230 the right of assembly,231
the freedom of association,232 and prohibitions on governmental ability to suspend the freedom of religion and conscience, even in emergency situations.233
Chile’s ratification of the ACHR thus reinforced its commitment
to honor the religious freedom obligations that it agreed to follow
upon adopting the ICCPR and the ICESCR during the Pinochet
era. Accordingly, the country’s international obligations have continued to form a central element of the national juridical regime governing the scope of religious freedom.
(4) Conclusion: Juridical developments in the post-Pinochet era.
In addition to achieving a general consolidation of civilian democracy, the post-Pinochet period has affirmed and expanded Chile’s religious human rights obligations and related juridical regime. Affirmation has occurred as existing constitutional guarantees, numerous
legislative provisions, and national obligations under international
law have continued to recognize many of the religious liberty-related
rights and norms established during the Pinochet regime. Expansion
has taken place as new legislative provisions, including the 1999 Law
of Worship, have broadened the scope of religious freedom. Though
recently enacted, the Law of Worship promises to accomplish much
in Chile’s endeavors to better protect religious human rights.
b. Government perception and treatment of religious organizations,
doctrines, and practices. As might be expected, the ideologically
based repression and favoritism that characterized the Pinochet regime’s perception and treatment of religious groups and beliefs has
not carried over into the post-Pinochet period. Throughout the
1990s, therefore, human rights observers have reported that “[a]ll
denominations practice their faiths without restriction”234 or that

230. Compare ACHR, supra note 225, at 148-49, art. 13, with ICCPR, supra note 96, at
178, art. 19.
231. Compare ACHR, supra note 225, at 149, art. 15, with ICCPR, supra note 96, at
178, art. 21.
232. Compare ACHR, supra note 225, at 149, art. 16, with ICCPR, supra note 96, at
178, art. 22.
233. Compare ACHR, supra note 225, at 152, art. 27, with ICCPR, supra note 96, at
174, art. 4.
234. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 106TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 1999 (2000) (visited May 20, 2000) <http://www.state.gov/www/global
/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/chile.html> [hereinafter 1999 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS];
see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 106TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
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most religious groups have affirmed being free of government interference in practicing their respective faiths.235 Also, the civilian government’s efforts to consolidate its power has made it responsive to
minority religious groups’ needs, as evidenced by its efforts to create
the Advisory Commission for the Organization and Functioning of
Pentecostal Entities236 and bestow equal juridical standing on all religious groups.237
At the same time, however, the government undeniably has
treated religious groups differently. For example, the United States
State Department has affirmed consistently since 1995 (unfortunately, without providing much proof) that the “the Catholic
Church enjoys a privileged position among religions”238 and “receives preferential official treatment.”239 Chile’s Protestant population recently complained about the Catholic Church’s privileged position and charged the government with engaging in discriminatory

PRACTICES FOR 1998, at 540 (1999) [hereinafter 1998 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS]; U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, 105TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1997, at 447 (1998) [hereinafter 1997 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS]; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
105TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1996, at 385 (1997)
[hereinafter 1996 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS]; 1995 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note
210, at 358; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 104TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 1994, at 346 (1995) [hereinafter 1994 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS]; U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, 103D CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1993, at 388 (1994) [hereinafter 1993 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS]; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
103D CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1992, at 356 (1993)
[hereinafter 1992 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS]; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 102D CONG., COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1991, at 529 (1992) [hereinafter 1991
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS].
235. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 102D CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 1990, at 542 (Comm. Print 1991) [hereinafter 1990 HUMAN RIGHTS
REPORTS].
236. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
238. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 106TH CONG., ANN. REP. ON INT’L FREEDOM FOR 1999:
CHILE (Comm. Print 1999) (visited May 23, 2000) <http://www.state.gov/www/global
/human_rights/irf/irf_rpt/1999/irf_chile99.html> [hereinafter 1999 INTERNATIONAL
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT].
239. Id.; see also 1999 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 234; 1998 HUMAN RIGHTS
REPORTS, supra note 234, at 540; 1997 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 234, at 447;
1996 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 234, at 385; 1995 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS,
supra note 210, at 358. The State Department’s general statements appear to be supported by
the fact that in 1998 the Chilean government contributed more than $3 million (USD) to the
Catholic Church to cover costs incurred by a Church-sponsored conference attended by
500,000 youth from the Western Hemisphere. See 1999 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 238.
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conduct in multiple ways. As the State Department reported in
1999,
[t]he country’s Protestants assert that the Government discriminates against them, based upon differing legal status afforded to
non-Catholics. They cite the absence of Protestant armed forces
chaplains (all chaplains are Catholic), difficulties for pastors to visit
military hospitals, and the predominantly Catholic religious education in public schools. Military recruits, whatever their religion, often have to attend Catholic events involving their unit, and being a
Catholic is considered beneficial to one’s military career.240

With respect to Protestant claims of discrimination in attaining
legal personality, it is interesting to note that during the early and
mid-1990s the Ministry of Justice denied at least two Pentecostal
groups’ petitions for legal personality because the groups allegedly
were religious sects whose “practices seriously violate human dignity.”241 Soon thereafter, however, the Ministry reversed its decision
with respect to one of the groups due to pressure from numerous
Pentecostal churches and organizations.242 The Ministry’s reversal
suggests that its original decision rested on grounds of an arbitrary, if
not discriminatory, nature.243
Since 1997, numerous other incidents have occurred that raise
questions about the government’s support of religious liberty, particularly with respect to religious minorities and smaller religious
groups. For example, the United States State Department reported
in January 1997 that Chile’s “small Jewish population is free to practice its religion but faces some discrimination in public life.”244 This
comment referred to a series of incidents during which a cabinet
minister and subcabinet member made anti-Semitic remarks.245
Though neither official took discriminatory action against any Jewish

240. 1999 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 238.
241. Decreto No. 528, 29 de mayo de 1995, D.O., 4 de junio de 1995, preamble (“sus
prácticas violenta gravamente la dignidad humana”); see also Decreto No. 1126, 10 de
noviembre de 1995, D.O., 9 de enero de 1996 (noting that the Universal Church of the
Kingdom of God’s original petition had been denied).
242. See Decreto No. 1126, preamble.
243. But see 1999 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 238
(“Government refusal to register a religious group . . . is rare . . . .”).
244. 1996 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 234, at 385.
245. See id.
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organizations, their comments fostered a severe feeling of intolerance
that affected the entire Jewish community.246
Similarly, in late 1997, the Ministry of the Interior refused to renew the visas of seven Brazilian pastors belonging to the Universal
Church of the Kingdom of God, stating suspicions that the group’s
followers might be forced to make donations.247 The Brazilian pastors’ attorneys accused the government of acting arbitrarily and failing to respect religious freedom, arguing that the pastors did not
violate Chile’s immigration laws prohibiting persons possessing a
tourist visa from participating in “activities with remuneration,” even
though the pastors subsisted on donations made by church members.248 The pastors lost their appeal to the local courts and were ordered to leave the country.249
Likewise, the Chilean government expelled a Hindu religious
leader in 1998 for committing a crime against the country’s “morals
and good customs.”250 Media reports alleged that the expulsion
246. I was in Santiago shortly after these events occurred as part of a research project
concerning the history of Chile’s Jewish community and noticed the high degree of agitation
and uncertainty created within the Jewish community by the government officials’ comments.
Indeed, members of the Jewish community, and even of the community’s principal organizations, remained so fearful of opening up to “outsiders” that they declined to assist me with my
research.
In February 1999, a similar problem arose when the government named as Vice
Minister of the Interior an individual who allegedly made an anti-Semitic remark while serving
as Vice Minister of Public Works in 1996. See 1999 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
REPORT, supra note 238. The official denied the accusation, stating that his comments “had
been purely political.” Id. Unlike the 1997 incident, the situation with the Vice Minister resolved itself peacefully after Jewish representatives accepted his declarations “that he was not an
anti-Semite.” Id.
247. See Apelan Lideres de Secta Religiosa por Negativa de Visa, NOTIMEX, Nov. 10,
1997, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Notcia File [hereinafter Apelan Lideres]. The same
charges had been made against the group’s founder in Brazil. See id.
248. Claudio Centro T., Abogado Fidel Reyes: “No se Respeta la Libertad de Cultos”, LA
TERCERA, Mar. 18, 1998 (copy on file with author) (“ejercer actividades con remuneración”);
cf. Apelan Lideres, supra note 247 (quoting attorney Pedro Canihuete’s statement that the
church has been persecuted since its establishment). Catholic church leaders declined to comment extensively on the situation, saying only that “[t]he Brazilians’ problem is not of freedom
of worship, which is guaranteed in the Constitution, but of administrative reasons adopted by
the authority.” Iglesia Católica: “No nos Opinar”, LA TERCERA, Mar. 18, 1998 (copy on file
with author) (“El problema de los brasileños no es de libertad de culto, el cual está garantizado
en la Constitución, sino de razones administrativas adoptadas por la autoridad.”).
249. See Ordena Gobierno Chileno Explusión Contra Misioneros Brasileños, NOTIMEX
(Feb. 19, 1998), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Notcia File.
250. Guru Hace su Show, EL NORTE, Sep. 7, 1998, at 9, available at1998 WL 13029661
(“la moral y las buenas costumbres”).
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stemmed from the guru’s “scandalous sex life”—in accordance with
his religious beliefs, the guru had six wives.251
Moreover, in October 1999, a medical clinic in Antofagasta obtained a court order “to provide a blood transfusion to a critically ill”
Jehovah’s Witness, even though the patient had “brought papers
with her [to the clinic] testifying to the fact that she didn’t want
blood transfusions because she is a Jehovah’s Witness.”252 The clinic
noted that it had obtained similar assistance from the courts on four
other occasions.253
Finally, throughout the late 1990s, the Chilean government has
carried out at least eight police raids on Colonia Dignidad, 254 a religious colony that was stripped of its legal status in 1991 for alleged
financial crimes255 and has been accused of having served in part as a
detention and torture center during the Pinochet period.256 In addition to attempting to arrest the group’s presently fugitive leader on
sexual abuse charges,257 police searched the commune’s facilities for
weapons, explosives, and drugs.258 Members of the colony denounced the government’s actions, believing that the government’s
“ultimate goal” is to “split up or liquidate[]”259 the group. “We have
nothing to hide. They say we are a sect of fanatically religious people,
but that is wrong. All our people are Christians, . . . but our main
aim is to create a spirit of family in the community.”260
Thus, despite the fact that the politically based repression and favoritism that characterized the Pinochet regime’s perception and

251. Id. (“escandalosa vida sexual”). The media’s speculations apparently also resulted
from the fact that after being expelled from Chile, guru Badani hosted a television program in
Peru about eroticism. See id.
252. Current News Briefs, CHIPS, Oct. 12, 1999, available in 1999 WL 10739144.
253. See id.
254. See Hugh Davies, German Settlers Under Siege in Chile: Are they Nazi Brainwashers
and Child Abusers, or Guardians of Family Values?, DAILY TELEGRAPH, July 9, 1997, at 18,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Telegr File. For a brief discussion of claims regarding Colonia Dignidad’s involvement with the Pinochet regime, see supra note 169.
255. See Chile: Decision to Dissolve Secret German Colony Ratified, Inter Press Service,
June 19, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Inpres File (stating that President Patricio
Aylwin revoked Colonia Dignidad’s legal status for “charges of tax evasion, violation of nonprofit status and other financial aberrations”).
256. See supra note 173.
257. See Hammer, supra note 169, at 14.
258. See Davies, supra note 254, at 18.
259. Id. (quoting Dr. Harmutt Hopp).
260. Id. (quoting Wolfgang Muller).
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treatment of religious groups and beliefs has not carried over into
the post-Pinochet period and that the civilian government has made
efforts to respond to minority religious groups’ needs, an element of
preferential treatment and discrimination in the government’s treatment of religious groups has continued to exist. Though government acts of discriminatory treatment have not risen to the level of
persecution, they nevertheless have fostered, at the very least, an atmosphere of religious intolerance that hinders the growth of religious liberty.261
c. Popular perception and treatment of religious organizations,
doctrines, and practices. Popular perceptions and treatment of religious organizations, doctrines, and practices have influenced the development of religious freedom in several ways during the postPinochet era. First, in the early 1990s, lingering ideological perceptions identifying the LDS Church as either a supporter of the Pinochet regime or agent of United States imperialism prompted leftist
guerrilla groups to continue their attacks on, and bombings of, LDS
chapels throughout Chile.262 Though these actions remained politically motivated and did not formally affect the church’s ability to exercise its right to freely assemble and manifest its beliefs,263 they

261. Developments in Chile’s last two presidential elections provide perhaps the best evidence of this atmosphere of intolerance and suspicion. In 1993, presidential candidate Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle confronted rumors that he, if elected, would oppress Pentecostal
churches. See Benigno Ramos, Frei Desmintió Persecución a Iglesias Evangélicas, LA TERCERA,
Nov. 8, 1993, at 10, available in DIALOG, Info-South File. Similarly, in 1999, presidential
candidate Ricardo Lagos disputed rumors that, if elected, he would prohibit Pentecostals from
preaching publicly. See J.A.Q., Lagos Desmiente Rumores a Evangélicos, LA TERCERA, Apr. 22,
1999 (visited May 11, 2000) <http://www.tercera.cl/diario/1999/04/22/22.04.3a.
POL.LAGOS.html>.
262. See 1993 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 234, at 390 (reporting 15 bombings of LDS chapels and two instances of confrontations between terrorists and worshippers);
1992 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 234, at 356 (“The Mormon Church continued to
be a target of leftwing terrorist groups . . . , apparently for political rather than religious reasons.”); 1991 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 234, at 525 (reporting “more than 30
[politically motivated] bombings of Mormon churches”); 1990 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS,
supra note 235, at 537, 542 (reporting more than 53 politically motivated acts of terrorism by
leftist guerrillas, including bombings of LDS chapels, and one politically-motivated physical
attack on a missionary from the United States).
263. As an LDS missionary in Santiago between 1991 and 1993, I witnessed the
Church’s response to such acts of terrorism. Though fixing the damaged buildings inconvenienced members and cost the Church a good deal of money, the bombings never prevented
local congregations from holding their normal worship services and failed to influence the
Church to ever even consider dissolving its local congregations or modifying its local activities.
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nonetheless added an element of religious intolerance to Chilean society.
Second, although Chileans “generally are tolerant of religious
differences, . . . some discrimination occurs” that favors the Catholic
Church.264 For example, “[n]on-Catholic clergymen sometimes have
difficulties gaining access to prisons and public hospitals” where admittance “is at the discretion of administrators.”265 Unlike their nonCatholic counterparts, however, “Catholic priests usually do not face
such difficulties.”266
Third, popular stereotypes of religious groups have established
widespread notions of the inferiority of certain (generally nonCatholic) churches and their followers. In 1997, for example, Juan
Alberty Rabat, a representative of the Committee of Evangelical Organizations, stated that “[t]he marginalization [of Pentecostals] is a
concrete fact. For a long time[,] Pentecostals belonged to the lowest
sectors of the population[,] and prejudice is born from that: we are
considered second category persons. People forget the tremendous
contribution that our church has made to the country.”267 Proof of
such prejudice and marginalization, Rabat asserted, lays in the fact
that people are surprised to learn that “successful” people (like himself) belong to the religion.268
Fourth, popular religious-based prejudices have increased during
the past decade in response to intensifying interdenominational rivalries and tensions arising from the success of non-Catholic missionary
endeavors among Catholics.269 The rise of such popular prejudices
generally has coincided with religious groups’ increasingly antagonistic confrontations with, and attitudes toward, one another. In 1999,
for example, various Pentecostal groups opposed the enactment of
the Law of Worship because it provided equal juridical status and re264. 1999 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 238.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Patricia Schüller, “Somos Considerados Personas de Segunda Categoría”, LA TERCERA,
May 31, 1997, (copy on file with author) (“La marginación hacia nosotros es un hecho concreto. Durante mucho tiempo los evangélicos pertenecieron a los sectores más bajos de la población y de allí nace el prejuicio: somos considerados personas de segunda categoría. La gente
se olvida del tremendo aporte que ha hecho al país nuestra iglesia.”).
268. See id.
269. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 177-79; see also Edward L. Cleary, The
Catholic Church, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND EVANGELIZATION, supra note 15, at 24-25;
Moreno, supra note 215, at 56.
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ligious rights to the LDS Church and Jehovah’s Witnesses.270 Similarly, Catholic officials disapproved of the law in part because it apparently extended its benefits and protections to “satanic groups and
other sects.”271 Also, negative discussions in the national press about
the allegedly violent and illegal activities of small religious groups
operating in Chile have resulted in calls for legislation banning such
“religious sects.”272
Most importantly, since 1999, the Catholic Church’s relations
with non-Catholic groups have been strained due to the Church’s
increasingly combative attitude toward non-Catholic proselytizing
activities.273 In addition to promoting “active competition” with
non-Catholic groups,274 the Catholic hierarchy has harshly criticized
non-Catholic groups, especially the LDS Church.275 Not surprisingly,
many non-Catholic groups have reciprocated similar harsh feelings
and opinions about Catholicism and its perceived flaws and dangers.276
Though human rights observers to date have not identified these
and other similar progressively antagonistic interdenominational attitudes as obstacles to religious freedom in Chile,277 it is indisputable
270. See Protecting the Right to Convert, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Mar. 1, 1999, at 28, 28.
271. See Current Events Briefs, supra note 219.
272. See Enrique Mujica, Ante Hechos Conflictivos: Piden Leyes Contra Sectas Religiosas
que Operan en el Pais, EL MERCURIO, Sep. 16, 1992, at 1A, available in DIALOG, InfoSouth File (discussing endeavors to legislate against religious cults in Chile and noting such
cult practices as kidnapping minors and sending them abroad, arms trafficking, and compelling
cult followers to participate in sexual activities with each other).
273. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 177-79.
274. Id. at 178.
275. See id. at 177. Professors Fleet and Smith further noted that
[in an official pastoral publication, the Catholic bishops] were particularly critical of
the [Mormons], whom they saw as posing a danger for democratic society because
of their “doctrinal demagoguery,” their “theocratic, vertical and totalitarian structures,” their insistence on possessing the “absolute truth,” their control of information, their “total rejection of society and its institutions,” their “suppression of individual liberties” of their adherents, their insistence that new members “break all
former social ties upon entrance into the cult,” and their attitude that “all those outside the group” were enemies.
Id. (quoting CONFERENCIA EPISCOPAL DE CHILE, EVANGÉLICOS Y SECTAS: PROPUESTAS
PASTORALES 28 (1992)).
276. See Moreno, supra note 215, at 57-58.
277. See, e.g, 1999 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 238;
1999 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 234; 1998 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note
234, at 540; 1997 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 234, at 447; 1996 HUMAN RIGHTS
REPORTS, supra note 234, at 385; 1995 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 210, at 358;
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that they have resulted in “some discrimination” against religious
organizations and their followers.278 Further development of such
sentiments could pose a serious problem. Not only would such attitudes likely restrict individuals’ and religious groups’ abilities to
freely exercise their religious human rights but they could also discourage different religious groups’ ability and willingness to work
together for the benefit of Chilean society.
Even as the situation currently stands, however, popular prejudices have engendered instances of religious-based discrimination. In
mid-1999, for example, parents of fourteen students expelled by a
small private school in Santiago for alleged behavioral problems and
involvement with illegal drugs claimed that the students’ expulsion
resulted from religious discrimination.279 Specifically, the parents
claimed that the school discriminated against the children because
they belonged to “the strict Casa del Señor . . . sect” (a “fundamentalist religious group that originated in the United States”) and had
“distanced themselves from normal school goings on.”280
Thus, though politically motivated persecution influenced popular treatment of religious groups in the early 1990s, interdenominational rivalry and prejudices have become the most powerful factors
affecting popular perceptions and treatment of religious groups in
the post-Pinochet era. Such prejudices have not yet noticeably affected the development of religious liberty on a widespread basis, but
their current mode and rate of evolution suggests that they could
easily become a significant obstacle to de facto religious freedom.
d. Conclusion: The development of religious liberty in the postPinochet era. As demonstrated by the above analysis of (1) the development of Chile’s national juridical framework; (2) the civilian government’s perception and treatment of religious groups, beliefs, and
practices; and (3) popular perceptions and treatment of religious
groups, doctrines, and practices, the development of religious liberty
in the post-Pinochet era has generally paralleled the course it followed during the Pinochet period. On one hand, the national juridical regime has continued to define the scope of de jure protection
1994 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 234, at 346; 1993 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS,
supra note 234, at 388; 1992 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 235; 1991 HUMAN
RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 235; 1990 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 235.
278. 1999 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 238.
279. See Current Events Briefs, CHIPS, July 1, 1999, available in 1999 WL 10738804.
280. Id.
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provided to and by religious liberty. Similarly, on the other hand,
both the government’s unequal treatment of different religious
groups and popular perception and treatment of religious groups
have continued to obstruct de facto religious liberty, despite the fact
that the government and public have acted according to different
motivations and in different ways than during the Pinochet period.
The post-Pinochet development of religious liberty, therefore, has
continued to be characterized by contradictory developments that
have worked to simultaneously further and restrict religious freedom.
At the same time, however, the post-Pinochet period has expanded de jure protection of religious freedom to an unprecedented
level, especially through the enactment of the 1999 Law of Worship.
For reasons explained in Part IV.A, the Law of Worship constitutes
the most significant achievement in the development of religious liberty since the Pinochet regime’s adoption of the ICCPR, and arguably since the Constitution of 1925 first guaranteed the freedom of
religion and separation of church and state.
C. Conclusion: The Development of Religious Liberty in Chile During
the Pinochet and Post-Pinochet Periods
The saga of religious liberty in Chile has traveled an interesting
and unique path since 1973. Despite being guaranteed as a matter of
constitutional law since 1925, it was only during the past twenty-five
years, from the Pinochet period on, that religious liberty began to
take on more definite characteristics and juridical applications.
During the Pinochet regime, religious freedom’s most significant
advances occurred with the Pinochet government’s acceptance of the
ICCPR, which obliged Chile to apply religious freedom principles to
circumstances not addressed in Chilean national law. These juridical
gains, however, failed to make a noticeable impact on Chilean society
due to the politically motivated repression of religious groups and
clergy by both the Pinochet regime and the public at large.
In the post-Pinochet period, the development of Chile’s juridical
system has continued to extend religious liberty guarantees and
rights to new heights, particularly through the recent enactment of
the 1999 Law of Worship that established the legal equality of all religious organizations. These juridically-based gains, however, have
been undermined by the government’s continued practice of discriminating against religious organizations, especially minority
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groups, and the evolution of increasingly antagonistic interdenominational rivalries.
Compared against one another, the religious liberty-related developments that occurred in the Pinochet and post-Pinochet period
reveal several important facts about the evolution and current status
of religious freedom in Chile. First, as demonstrated by the previous
discussions on government and popular perceptions and treatment of
religious beliefs and groups, the national security policies and concerns that heavily influenced the exercise of religious freedom under
the Pinochet regime did not carry over to the post-Pinochet period.
While political ideology played a small role in promoting persecution
of the LDS Church in the early 1990s, interdenominational tensions
and rivalries have replaced politics as the primary factor affecting the
popular perception and treatment of religious groups. Moreover, the
civilian government’s attempts to consolidate democracy have induced it to eschew purely political confrontations and to be somewhat more responsive to the needs of minority religions.
Second, though the Pinochet regime added several notable provisions to Chile’s national juridical framework defining the scope of
religious freedom, the consolidation of democracy in the postPinochet period has greatly strengthened the country’s commitment
to protecting freedom of religion. Also, the Law of Worship has extended juridical protection of religious freedom to new areas of the
law and society and potentially gives the Chilean State a greater capacity to legally ensure that all religions enjoy the right to freely exercise their respective beliefs.
IV. THE FUTURE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN CHILE: POTENTIAL
DEVELOPMENTS AND PROBLEMS
In light of the development of religious liberty in Chile to date,
it appears that Chile currently stands at a crossroads with respect to
the evolution of religious liberty. On one hand, the 1999 Law of
Worship promises a new and exciting era in the continued development and practice of religious freedom. On the other hand, government and popular pressures that restrict the full enjoyment of religious rights threaten to potentially hamper the rights and privileges
enshrined in the Law of Worship from reaching their full potential.
The situation thus begs the question: what course(s) will religious liberty follow in the near future in Chile? Will the Law of Worship strengthen Chile’s de jure obligations to religious freedom to
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the degree of overpowering, or at least overshadowing, those forces
that impose de facto limits on society’s ability to freely exercise religious belief? Will such factors as government favoritism, popular religion-based prejudices, and interdenominational rivalry advance de
facto religious intolerance so as to render the Law of Worship insignificant? Or will religious liberty merely continue upon the course it
has followed since 1925, undulating in the tension generated by
competing de jure and de facto influences?
Though the answer to these and other similar questions presently
remains unascertainable, three particular factors possess the potential
to influence the course of religious freedom in Chile’s near future:
the Law of Worship, ecumenism, and the increasing participation of
Protestant groups in Chilean socio-political matters. Each, however,
could affect the development of religious freedom in various unique
ways.
A. The 1999 Law of Worship and Chile’s De Jure Commitment to
Religious Freedom
A close examination of the Law of Worship (“the Law”) indicates that it merits its classification as “an historic victory” 281 in the
quest to “reaffirm the freedom of worship”282 and “help guarantee
that all faiths and creeds are given equal treatment by the state of
Chile.”283 The Law accomplishes these two objectives by (1) consolidating and synthesizing the various constitutional, legislative, and
international legal provisions that Chile has adopted since the commencement of the Pinochet period; (2) adding several significant
provisions not previously incorporated into Chile’s juridical regime;
and (3) orchestrating the processes by which religious organizations
are formed and dissolved in such a way that removes much of the potential for arbitrariness and discrimination on the part of government
officials. The law thus marks a significant juridical advance in the
evolution of Chile’s de jure commitment to religious freedom and
could potentially reduce, if not eliminate, the Chilean government’s
capacity to act in ways that place de facto restrictions on religious liberty. At the same time, however, structural defects within the Law

281. Current Events Briefs, supra note 217.
282. Parlamento Aprobó, supra note 216.
283. Current Events Briefs, supra note 217.

1247

THU-FIN.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9/25/00 10:36 PM

[2000

could just as easily continue many arbitrary and discriminatory government practices.
1. The Law of Worship’s primary provisions
The Law of Worship is divided into five chapters covering: (1)
general rules relating to religious freedom; (2) specific norms
governing the freedom of religion and worship; (3) procedural rules
regulating the attainment of public legal standing as a religious organization; (4) assets and tax exemptions; and (5) procedural rules
directing the dissolution of religious organizations. Following is a
brief examination of these chapters’ main provisions.284
a. General norms. The first chapter of the Law affirms three central elements of Chile’s juridical regime relating to religious freedom.
Specifically, the Law (1) requires the national government to guarantee the freedom of religion as set forth in the Constitution, (2) proscribes discrimination on the basis of religious belief, and (3) obligates the national government to guarantee the free exercise of
religious belief by both individuals and religious groups.285
b. Freedom of religion and worship. This chapter accomplishes two
functions. First, it consolidates the primary religious liberty-related
norms that have become part of Chile’s juridical regime during the
past twenty-five years, including (1) the freedom of conscience and
belief;286 (2) the right to freely exercise religious belief;287 (3) the
freedom of expression;288 (4) the right of parents to control their
child’s religious education;289 and (5) the freedom of assembly.290
Second, the chapter adds two new religious rights to Chile’s juridical
regime: (1) an individual’s right to religious assistance from his or
her own religion, subject to any limitations of access imposed by the

284. For the complete text of the Law in both Spanish and English, see Appendix.
285. See Ley No. 19,638, 1 de octubre de 1999, D.O., 14 de octubre de 1999, arts. 1-3.
286. Compare id. art. 6(a), with CHILE CONST. (Constitution of 1980) art. 19, no. 6,
and ICCPR, supra note 96, at 178, art. 18(1)-(2).
287. Compare Ley No. 19,638 art. 6(a)-(b), with CHILE CONST. (Constitution of 1980)
art. 19, no. 6, and ICCPR, supra note 96, at 178, art. 18(3).
288. Compare Ley No. 19,638 art. 6(d), with CHILE CONST. (Constitution of 1980) art.
19, no. 6, and ICCPR, supra note 96, at 178, art. 19(2).
289. Compare Ley No. 19,638 art. 6(d), with Decreto No. 924, 12 de septiembre de
1983, D.O., 7 de enero de 1984, and ICCPR, supra note 96, at 178, art. 18(4).
290. Compare Ley No. 19,638 art. 6(e), with CHILE CONST. (Constitution of 1980) art.
19, no. 13, and ICCPR, supra note 96, at 178, art. 22(1)-(2).
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responsible government ministry291 and (2) the right of religious organizations to exercise absolute autonomy over their internal organization and selection and training of clergy.292
c. Public legal standing. The most significant provision set forth
in this chapter involves the granting of public legal personality to all
religious organizations that complete the pertinent procedural requirements.293 With respect to those requirements, the most significant (1) allow the formation of religious legal persons as nonprofit
corporations, foundations, and associations; (2) require prospective
religious organizations to register with the Ministry of Justice; and
(3) prohibit the Ministry of Justice from denying a petition for legal
standing, with the exception that petitions may be rejected if they
contain errors or lack required information.294
d. Assets and tax exemptions. Closely paralleling norms established by the juridical regime during the Pinochet era,295 this chapter
(1) allows religious organizations to purchase, sell, and administer all
forms of property; (2) permits religious entities to solicit and receive
donations and tithes from their members and public and private institutions; (3) exempts from taxation those donations given to religious organizations with legal standing; (4) grants all religious entities the same rights, exemptions, and tax benefits; and (5) allows
religious juridical persons formed under the Law to regularize their
ownership of property registered publicly or in the name of natural
or juridical persons.296 Of necessity, this chapter treats tax exemptions in a much more general manner than does the existing juridical
regime.297
e. Dissolution. Making a fundamental change from previous laws
governing the dissolution of religious organizations,298 this chapter
abolishes the government’s ability to dissolve religious entities via an
administrative decree. The new procedure requires dissolution to occur (1) in accordance with a religious juridical person’s statutes of incorporation or (2) through a complaint filed in court by the Council
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

See Ley No. 19,638 art. 6(c).
See id. art. 7.
See id. art. 9.
See id. arts. 10-13.
See supra notes 123-126 and accompanying text.
See Ley No. 19,638 arts. 15-18.
Compare id. with notes 123-126 and accompanying text
See, e.g., Decreto No. 110, 17 de enero de 1979, D.O., 20 de marzo de 1979.
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for the Defense of the State (CDE), the agency charged with defending the State’s legal interests in the national courts.299
2. The 1999 Law of Worship and Chile’s juridical regime
The above sketch of the Law’s provisions reveals that the Law
adds several noteworthy norms to Chile’s juridical framework governing religious liberty. For example, the Law (1) establishes an individual’s right to receive religious assistance from his or her own religious group, subject to any limitations of access to public institutions
imposed by the responsible government ministry;300 (2) guarantees
religious organizations’ right to exercise absolute autonomy over
their internal organization and selection and training of clergy;301 (3)
recognizes an individual’s right to receive a proper burial, without
religious discrimination;302 (4) grants public legal personality to all
incorporated religious organizations;303 (5) prohibits the Ministry of
Justice from denying religious organizations’ petitions for legal
standing unless flawed by errors or missing information;304 and (6)
outlines new requirements and procedures for dissolving religious
organizations.305
3. The 1999 Law of Worship and the future development of religious
liberty in Chile
In light of the above discussions about the Law of Worship’s
primary provisions and relation to Chile’s existing juridical regime, it
remains apparent that the Law completes its principal objectives of
“reaffirm[ing] the freedom of worship”306 and “help[ing] guarantee
that all faiths and creeds are given equal treatment by the state of
Chile”307 in several ways. First, the Law reaffirms the spectrum of
rights and guarantees previously associated with religious liberty by
synthesizing many of them into its provisions and treating them

299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
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See Ley No. 19,638 art. 19.
See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
See Ley No. 19,638 art. 6(b).
See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
See Ley No. 19,638 art. 11.
See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
Parlamento Aprobó, supra note 216.
Current Events Briefs, supra note 217.
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comprehensively. Second, the Law also reaffirms the freedom of religion by identifying additional rights that fall within religious liberty’s scope. Third, the Law helps guarantee the equal treatment of
religious organizations by the State by granting religious entities
equal juridical standing and altering the processes of incorporation
and dissolution. Rather than placing decision-making authority in
administrative officials, the Law requires the approbation of incorporation once a religious organization’s petition includes the pertinent,
correct information. Also, the Law removes the dissolution process
from the potentially arbitrary administrative agencies and vests it in
the courts.
The 1999 Law of Worship thus attempts to provide Chile with a
fresh, condensed view and understanding of religious liberty in a way
that reaffirms the country’s de jure guarantees and obligations and
lessens the possibility of government discrimination and partiality.
Despite these efforts, however, the Law fails to fully remove the potential for unequal treatment and discrimination for several reasons.
First, though the Law affirms general principles of religious liberty
and appears to encompass both organized and unorganized religious
groups, the Law’s focus on such matters as autonomy over ecclesiastical affairs, juridical personality, assets, and dissolution seems to cater specially to organized, incorporated religious groups. The absence of similar guarantees for nonincorporated or nontraditional
religious groups at the very least demonstrates a potential bias
against such groups in Chile’s legislative and juridical system. Moreover, it seems to favor traditional, organized groups’ interests in a
manner that discriminates against nontraditional, nonincorporated
groups.
Second, by requiring the State to guarantee freedom of religion
according to the terms set forth in the Constitution, the Law subjects religious freedom to the amorphous requirement that the maintenance or manifestation of religious belief not oppose “morals,
good customs or public order.”308 By reaffirming such a vague limit
and failing to delineate its scope or meaning, the Law essentially
grants the Chilean government, and ultimately the judiciary, an unregulated capacity to interpret which religious beliefs and practices
violate the constitutional regime.

308. CHILE CONST. (Constitution of 1980) art. 19, no. 6.
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Third, in its provisions regarding dissolution, the Law fails both
to recognize a cause of action that the CDE must assert to initiate
dissolution proceedings and to establish the legal standard for the
courts to employ in determining whether a religious organization
should be dissolved. By failing to include these elements and leaving
them to potentially be determined by future legislation, the Law exposes its dissolution provisions to the ever-unpredictable forces of
politics. Furthermore, the Law risks the possibility that the courts
will adopt as their decision-making standard—or even the CDE’s
cause of action—the malleable constitutional “not opposed to morals, good customs or public order” language.309
Therefore, the precise effect that the Law of Worship will have
on the future development of religious liberty in Chile remains uncertain. Though the Law contains many provisions that strengthen
Chile’s de jure commitment to, and protection of, freedom of religion in a manner that potentially lessens the importance of government practices on de facto religious liberty, its failure to fully and
adequately define the juridical limitations on religious liberty may
weaken the de jure regime, or at least allow government discrimination and partiality to continue to exert great influence on de facto religious liberty. Consequently, the Law’s ultimate impact on the future of religious liberty may depend on future legislative acts or the
manner in which the courts interpret it.
B. Ecumenism, Protestants and Politics, and De Facto Religious
Tolerance/Intolerance
1. The impotency of ecumenism
Since the early 1990s, interdenominational rivalry and related
popular prejudices concerning religious groups have emerged as two
of the major sources of de facto religious intolerance in post-Pinochet
Chile.310 In a society with many diverse religious groups and beliefs,
it may be that, at least to some degree, interdenominational rivalry
constitutes an inescapable element of reality. However, from a theoretical standpoint, ecumenism, an inclination or movement seeking
greater unity among religious groups through increased cooperation

309. Id.
310. See supra Part III.B.2.c.
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and improved understanding, could serve as a potent counterweight
to popular religious intolerance by fostering goodwill and awareness
among religious groups.
Since 1973, ecumenism has experienced some notable accomplishments in Chile. In the early to mid-1970s, for example, various
religious groups formed four separate institutions—CONAR,
COPACHI, the Vicariate of Solidarity, and FASIC—that provided
needed social services to victims of the Pinochet regime and their
families.311 The cooperation involved in establishing these institutions not only achieved an unprecedented level of ecumenical collaboration but also demonstrated the manner in which ideologically
and doctrinally diverse religious groups could put aside their differences and work together for the common good.
Similarly, since the early 1990s, different Protestant groups, including the Evangelicals and Pentecostals, have increased their ecumenical involvement with one another. In early 1991, a body called
the Committee of Evangelical Coordination began “meeting with
some regularity.”312 This group included representatives from various
Protestant and Pentecostal organizations, including the Christian
Fraternity of Churches, the Council of Pastors, and other churches
that remained politically neutral during the Pinochet period, such as
the Baptists and Anglicans.313 Also, in 1995, the Third General Assembly of the Latin American Council of Churches (CLAI) met in
Concepción, Chile, bringing together an unprecedented combination of historic Protestant and Pentecostal groups.314
More recently, religious leaders from several Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish institutions supported the creation of, and participated in, a “human rights round table” involving representatives
from the Chilean military and various human rights organizations.315
In addition, “a network of Catholic lay workers, priests and nuns as
well as Protestant bishops and pastors” encouraged Chileans to vote
311. See supra notes 152-153, 155-156 and accompanying text.
312. Cleary & Sepúlveda, supra note 170, at 121 n.107.
313. See id.
314. See Eugene L. Stockwell, Open and Closed, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Mar. 22, 1995, at
317, 317; see also Pentecostalism Tops Agenda, ANGLICAN J., Mar. 1995, at 8. The only nonProtestant group in attendance was the Chilean Orthodox Church. See id.
315. Human Rights Dialogue Gets Underway: Shaky Start to Groundbreaking Initiative,
CHIPS, Aug. 23, 1999, available in 1999 WL 10738992; see also Relatives of Disappeared Decline to Sit Down with Army Officers, EFE News Service, Aug. 8, 1999, available in WL
8/8/99 EFE News Serv.
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in the 1999 presidential election and “distribut[ed] letters in their
churches and communities calling on Christians to vote ‘in conscience’ for the candidate who ‘best represents the values of a just
society.’”316 Also, in March 2000, representatives of Chile’s Jewish,
Muslim, and Christian communities held a three-day-long symposium on spiritual traditions relating to peace, seeking to “create instances of reflection between the representatives” of the three
groups.317
Despite these successful ecumenical meetings and endeavors,
however, ecumenism has yet to exert a significant or long-term influence on interdenominational relations in Chile. Consequently, ecumenism presently lacks the capacity to combat much of the interdenominational rivalry and popular prejudice that has fostered an
atmosphere of de facto religious intolerance since the early 1990s.
Three principal reasons explain ecumenism’s failure to make
deeper inroads in Chile’s interdenominational arena. First, as illustrated by the dissolution of COPACHI in late 1975, because of
ideological differences, 318 ecumenical endeavors depend on some
degree of philosophical agreement, making them vulnerable to internal rifts as well as external pressures. Though the type of political polarization that doomed COPACHI no longer exists in Chile, differences of opinion as to social or political policy, or even the
appropriateness of religious organizations’ participation in politics,
have limited religious organizations’ ability to achieve the necessary
consensus to engage in ecumenical collaboration. Thus, while
“[e]cumenical groups exist [in Chile], . . . they often are formed on
an ad hoc basis, depending on the issue involved.”319
Second, to date, ecumenical efforts have involved only a relatively small number of religious groups: Catholics, Jewish organizations, historic Protestants, and some, but not all, Pentecostals and
Evangelicals. Literature addressing ecumenism fails to mention
whether such groups as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Mormons, and
other smaller minority religions have participated—or even been in316. Rights Lawyers and Religious Leaders Endorse Lagos as Wives Take Center Stage in
Campaign, CHIPS, Dec. 21, 1999, available in 1999 WL 10739356.
317. Cumbre Judeo-Cristiana-Musulmana por la Paz en Desierto Atacama, Spanish
Newswire Services, Sept. 2, 1999, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Efenew File.
318. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
319. 1999 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 238 (emphasis
added).
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vited to participate—in ecumenical activities. To be fully effective in
combating religious intolerance, ecumenism must incorporate as
many religious groups as possible instead of focusing on several
traditional or numerically superior groups.
Third, and perhaps most seriously, the Catholic Church and Pentecostal groups (the vast majority of Chilean Protestants) generally
have been either unable or unwilling to form ecumenical relationships. As two commentators observed,
[a]n impasse in interchurch relations [between the Catholic Church
and Pentecostal churches] exists at the institutional level, but a larger field exists that resembles the variety of human groupings in
Santiago’s Parque Florestal in late afternoon. At one extreme are
groups reaching out to others: the Centro Ecuménico Diego de
Medellín, the Instituto Pedro de Córdoba, the smaller Pentecostal
churches that joined the ecumenically minded World Council of
Churches (the first Pentecostal groups anywhere to do so), the
Fundación de Ayuda Social de las Iglesias Cristianas, and the National Catholic Commission on Ecumenism under Francisco Sampedro Nieto. At the other extreme are the Pentecostal churches
that do not cooperate even with other Protestant groups, much less
with Catholics. In between, a great many Catholics and Pentecostals pass one another by, without conflict, adjusting to differences
in gait.320

Recent studies have attributed the absence of ecumenism between Catholics and Pentecostals to Pentecostal unwillingness;
though “many Catholic priests [are] well disposed to seek dialogue
and cooperation with Pentecostals,” sixty-eight percent of Pentecostals surveyed “rejected the idea of dialogue with Catholics.”321
In light of Chile’s uneven and limited successes with ecumenism,
it appears unlikely that, at least for the near future, ecumenical collaboration will be able to act as a widely effective countermeasure to
the de facto intolerant effects of interdenominational rivalry and related popular religion-based prejudices. Ecumenism’s influence on
the development of religious liberty could increase, however, to the
extent that Chilean religious groups employ it on a regular basis, in320. Cleary & Sepúlveda, supra note 170, at 113 (footnotes omitted).
321. Id. One scholar concluded that Pentecostals’ general refusal to engage in dialogue
with Catholics resulted from Pentecostal pastors’ lack of an “intellectual basis for ecumenism.”
Id. (discussing Katherine Gilfeather O’Brien’s theories on Pentecostal attitudes toward ecumenical relations with the Catholic Church).
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volve a greater number of minority religions, and overcome the current impasse separating the Catholic and Pentecostal churches.
2. Problems with Protestants in politics
Throughout the 1990s, many Protestant organizations and individual Protestants have become increasingly active in socio-political
activities. In addition to gaining recognition as a significant sector of
the national electorate,322 for example, the Pentecostal community
sponsored its first presidential candidate, pastor Salvador Pino, in the
1999 election.323 Similarly, in 1994, Bishop Javier Vásquez Valencia,
president of Chile’s Pentecostal Methodist church, accepted Chilean
President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle’s invitation to form part of the
National Commission for Overcoming Poverty and actively involved
the Pentecostal community in the national fight against poverty.324
Furthermore, the Committee of Evangelical Organizations announced its intention in 1998 to collect information, in complete
confidentiality, about the fate of Chileans who “disappeared” by security forces and paramilitary groups under Pinochet.325
Though necessary to promote and protect the interests of the
Protestant community, the increased participation of Protestant organizations in politics and social issues possesses a strong potential to
exacerbate existing intra- and interdenominational rivalries that have
fomented religious intolerance in Chilean society. Consider, for example, the following three scenarios. First, Pentecostal leaders have
remained divided throughout the 1990s over the appropriateness of
Pentecostal religious organizations’ involvement in political affairs.
As seen above, Bishop Vásquez Valencia has actively promoted such

322. See Javier Vásquez Valencia, LA TERCERA, Mar. 1-7, 1997 (copy on file with author).
323. See Current Events Briefs, CHIPS, Aug. 17, 1999, available in 1999 WL 10738979.
Ten days after declaring his candidacy, however, Pino was “rejected by the Electoral Service”
for failing “to present the 35,232 signatures required by law to register as an independent candidate.” Current News Briefs, CHIPS, Aug. 26, 1999, available in 1999 WL 10739008.
About 10 % of the more than 37,000 signatures secured by Pino “were invalid because they
belonged to voters already registered in a political party.” Id.
324. See Carmen L. Ibarra, Los Evangélicos se Unen al Gobierno Contra la Pobreza, LA
TERCERA, Mar. 21, 1994, at 9, available at DIALOG, Info-South File; Valencia, supra note
322.
325. See F. de Ruyt & J. Ortega, Evangélicos Abrieron Templos para Recabar Datos Sobre
Desaparecidos, LA TERCERA, Sept. 14, 1998 (visited May 19, 2000) <http://www.tercera.cl/
diario/09/14/2.html>.
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involvement in several instances. On other occasions, however,
Vásquez and other Pentecostal leaders have asserted that churches
and clergy should stay out of politics.326 Such contradictory attitudes
towards religious organizations’ and leaders’ participation in politics
could cause intradenominational rifts between Pentecostal leaders
and members, in addition to interdenominational conflict between
Pentecostals and religious groups of the opposite opinion.
Second, in the 1999 presidential election, Protestant leaders and
religious organizations endorsed different candidates for varying religion-based reasons. “Leaders of the Pentecostal, Methodist, Baptist
and other Protestant churches publicly endorsed [the coalition] candidate Ricardo Lagos,” stating that they did “not trust [the Conservative] candidate Joaquin Lavin” because he belonged to the Catholic congregation Opus Dei, “the most anti-Evangelical group known
in the countries where it exists.”327 However, pastor and former
presidential candidate Salvador Pino supported Lavin, arguing that
Lavin “puts principles and values into play above all else.”328 This
type of division of support for political candidates among Protestant
leaders and groups for religiously based reasons could generate intradenominational conflict between Protestant leaders and church
members and different Protestant organizations.
Third, and most important, Protestant political support for such
morally divisive issues as divorce would place many Protestant organizations against the political agenda of the Catholic Church. Notably, Chile remains “the only country in the world where divorce is
illegal.”329 A 1994 report stated that most Protestant churches in
Chile favor the enactment of a divorce law.330 The Catholic Church,
however, has strongly objected to such a law and actively worked to
326. See id.; Jorge Silva, Cuenta con 1.802.000 fieles: Iglesia Evangélica Creció Seis Por
Ciento en 1993, LA TERCERA, Mar. 7, 1994, at 8, available in DIALOG, Info-South File; Two
Dead, Eight Injured in Pinochet Coup Anniversary in Chile, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept.
12, 1999, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFP File.
327. Current News Briefs, CHIPS, Jan. 7, 2000, available in 2000 WL 7221563.
328. Current News Briefs, CHIPS, Sept. 27, 1999, available in 1999 WL 10739099.
329. Till Death Do Us Part: Chile Debates Legalizing Divorce, CHIPS, Sept. 7, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 8627532 [hereinafter Till Death Do Us Part]. Chile, however, allows
the annulment of marriages on technical grounds, a practice that has been criticized for favoring the rich who can afford the required annulment fee, promoting illegitimacy, and leaving
women “without the right to property or child support.” FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at
174; see also Till Death Do Us Part, supra.
330. See Benigno Ramos, Evangélicos, a Favor de Una Ley Sobre Divorcio, LA TERCERA,
May 12, 1994, at 9, available in DIALOG, Info-South File.
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defeat efforts to pass a divorce law in the early and mid-1990s.331 In
opposing the proposed law, Catholic officials “denied wanting to
oppose Catholic doctrine on non-Catholics, and praised religious
freedom as a positive good. But they added that they had an evangelical mission to fulfill, and that it would be a mistake . . . to allow
individual churches . . . to establish their own doctrines in these matters.”332 Protestant leaders’ and organizations’ support for a divorce
law would thus plunge them in a battle with the Catholic Church,
assuredly adding to the strained relations and interdenominational
strife that presently exists between the two groups.
In light of the above scenarios, it remains apparent that increased
political involvement by Protestant organizations and leaders presents a difficult issue. Protestant organizations and leaders should be
free to pursue those measures that, in their respective judgment, best
further their community’s interests. However, such participation
could create and exacerbate both intra- and interdenominational discord similar to that which has promoted religious intolerance
throughout the past decade. This would be particularly true in the
event that Protestant organizations challenged the Catholic Church’s
opposition to such moral issues as divorce.
V. CONCLUSION
The development of religious liberty in Chile has followed a
unique course between 1973 and 2000. In comparison with the periods 1925-1973 and 1990-2000, religious liberty between 1973
and 1990, under the regime headed by General Pinochet, evolved in
an abnormal manner. Rather than emerging in response to such traditional issues as classic liberalism and religious pluralism, freedom of
religion under the Pinochet regime became almost exclusively a
function of the military government’s authoritarian, anti-Marxist national security ideology, policies, and concerns. This extreme politicization of religious liberty resulted in the establishment of de facto
religious intolerance, as individual clergymen and religious organizations both suffered governmental and popular persecution in accordance with their perceived political position. Simultaneously, Chile’s
juridical regime succeeded in expanding its protection of religious
liberty through both the enactment of national legislation and adop331. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 174-75.
332. Id.
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tion of international treaties. These de jure measures regarding religious freedom also fell victim to the regime’s political focus, however, as the military government suspended many elements of the juridical system through the use emergency powers. Freedom of
religion under the Pinochet dictatorship was thus characterized by
contradictory developments that worked to simultaneously further
and restrict its development.
In the post-Pinochet period, the development of Chile’s juridical
system has continued to extend de jure religious liberty guarantees
and rights to new areas of the law, particularly through the recent
enactment of the 1999 Law of Worship that established the legal
equality of all religious organizations. These de jure gains, however,
have been undermined as a matter of de facto reality by the government’s continued practice of discriminating against minority religious groups and the evolution of increasingly antagonistic interdenominational rivalries.
Compared against one another, the religious liberty-related developments that occurred in the Pinochet and post-Pinochet period
reveal several important facts about the evolution and current status
of religious freedom in Chile. First, as demonstrated by the previous
discussions on governmental and popular perceptions and treatment
of religious beliefs and groups, the national security policies and concerns that heavily influenced the exercise of religious freedom under
the Pinochet regime did not carry over to the post-Pinochet period.
Government practices, however, have continued to promote de facto
religious intolerance. Second, though the Pinochet regime added
several notable provisions to Chile’s national juridical framework defining the scope of religious freedom, the consolidation of democracy in the post-Pinochet period has greatly strengthened the country’s commitment to protecting freedom of religion. In particular,
the Law of Worship, which extended juridical protection of religious
freedom to new areas of the law and society, potentially gives the
Chilean state a greater capacity to legally ensure that all religions enjoy the right to freely exercise their respective beliefs.
The precise impact that the Law of Worship and nonjuridical factors such as interdenominational rivalry, ecumenism, and the involvement of religious organizations in politics will have on the future development of religious liberty in Chile currently remains
unknown. What remains certain, however, is that religious liberty in
Chile potentially stands at the threshold of a new era. Free of the de
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facto limitations imposed upon it by the Pinochet regime, religious
liberty could develop along numerous lines. For the present, however, religious liberty in Chile will apparently continue to follow the
course it has traveled since 1973, undulating in the tension generated by competing de jure and de facto influences.
Patrick J. Thurston ∗

∗ I would like to thank the following people for supporting my endeavors in completing this Comment: Erica, for her constant support and patience; my family, for their encouragement; Professor Cole Durham, for persuading me to not abandon the project when things
got difficult; and Professors Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr., for mentoring me in
Latin American history and teaching me about the tragedy of military antipolitics and protected democracy.
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Appendix
THE 1999 LAW OF WORSHIP
Original Spanish Text

English Version
(translated by this author)

Capítulo I
Normas generales

Chapter I
General Rules

Art. 1°. El Estado guarantiza la
libertad religiosa y de culto en
los términos de la Constitución
Política de la Repúblic.

Art. 1. The State guarantees
the freedom of religion and
worship under the terms of the
Political Constitution of the
Republic.

Art. 2°. Ninguna persona
podrá ser discriminada en
virtud de sus creencias
religiosas, ni tampoco prodrán
éstas invocarse como motivo
para suprimir, restringir o
afectar la igualdad consagrada
en la Constitución y la ley.

Art. 2. No person can be
subjected to discrimination
due to his or her religious
beliefs; neither can one’s
religious beliefs be invoked as a
reason to abolish, restrict, or
affect the equality granted in
the Constitution and the law.

Art. 3°. El Estado guarantiza
que las personsas desarrollen
libremente sus actividades
religiosas y la libertad de las
iglesias, confesiones y entidades
religiosas.

Art. 3. The State guarantees
that people may freely develop
and exercise their religious
activities; and the State
guarantees the freedom of
churches, confessions, and
religious entities.

Art. 4°. Para los efectos de esta
ley, se entiende por iglesias,
confesiones o instituciones
religiosas a las entidades
integradas por personas

Art. 4. For the purposes of the
present law, it is understood
that the terms “churches,”
“confessions” or “religious
institutions” refer to
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naturales que profesen una
determinada fe.

entities composed of natural
persons who profess a
particular faith.

Art. 5°. Cada vez que esta ley
emplea el término “entidad
religiosa”, se entenderá que se
refiere a las iglesias, confesiones
e instituciones religiosas de
cualquier culto.

Art. 5. Each time that this law
uses the term “religious
entity,” it will be understood
to refer to the churches,
confessions, and religious
institutions of any faith.

Capítulo II
Libertad religiosa y de culto

Chapter II
Freedom of Religion and
Worship

Art. 6°. La libertad religiosa y
de culto, con la
correspondiente autonomía e
inmunidad de coacción,
significan para toda persona, a
lo menos, las facultades de:

Art. 6. The freedom of
religion and worship, with its
corresponding autonomy and
immunity from coercion,
signifies for all people, at the
least, the right to:

1262

(a) Profesar la creencia
religiosa que libremente
elija o no profesar ninguna;
manifestarla libremente o
abstenerse de hacerlo; o
cambiar o abandonar la que
profesaba;

(a) Profess the religious
belief that they freely
choose, or to profess no
belief; to freely manifest
such belief, or to abstain
from doing so; or to
change or abandon the
religious belief that they
used to profess;

(b) Practicar en público o
en privado, individual o
colectivamente, actos de
oración o de culto;
conmemorar sus
festividades; celebrar sus
ritos; observar su día de
descanso semanal; recibir a

(b) Practice in public or
private, individually or
collectively, acts of prayer
or of worship;
commemorate their
festivals; celebrate their
rites; observe their weekly
day of rest; receive a
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su muerte una sepultura
digna, sin discriminación
por razones religiosas; no
ser obligada a practicar
actos de culto o a recibir
asistencia religiosa contraria
a sus convicciones
personales y no ser
pertubada en el ejercicio de
estos derechos;

deserving burial, without
discrimination for religious
reasons; not be obligated
to practice acts of worship
or to receive religious
assistance contrary to their
personal convictions, and
not be disturbed in
exercising these rights;

(c) Recibir asistencia
religiosa de su propia
confesión donde quiera que
se encuentre. La forma y
condiciones del acceso de
pastores, sacerdotes y
ministros de culto, para
ortogar asistencia religiosa
en recintos hospitalarios,
cárceles y lugares de
detención y en los
establecimientos de las
Fuerzas Armadas y de las de
Orden y Seguridad, serán
reguladas mediante
reglamentos que dictará el
Presidente de la República,
a través de los Ministros de
Salud, de Justicia y de la
Defensa Nacional,
respectivamente;

(c) Receive religious
assistance from their own
religion wherever they may
be. The form and
conditions of access of
pastors, priests, and
ministers of religion to
provide religious assistance
in hospitals, jails and places
of detention, and the
facilities of the Armed
Forces and the forces of
Order and Security will be
regulated by regulations
that the President of the
Republic will issue through
the Ministers of Health,
Justice, and National
Defense, respectively;

(d) Recibir e impartir
enseñanza o información
religiosa por cualquier
medio; elegir para sí—y los
padres para sus menores no
emancipados y los
guardadores para los

(d) Receive and impart
religious teachings or
information by whatever
means; to choose for
themselves—and parents
on behalf of their minor
children, and guardians on
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incapaces bajo su tuición y
cuidado— la educación
religiosa y moral que esté
de acuerdo con sus propias
convicciones, y

behalf of their wards—the
moral and religious
education that is in
harmony with their own
convictions; and

(e) Reunirse o manifestarse
públicamente con fines
religiosos y asociarse para
desarrollar
comunitariamente sus
actividades religiosas, de
conformidad con el
ordenamiento jurídico
general y con esta ley.

(e) Meet or manifest
themselves publicly for
religious purposes and
associate in order to carry
out their religious activities
as a community, in
accordance with general
legal norms and the
present law.

Art. 7°. En virtud de la libertad
religiosa y de culto, se reconoce
a las entidades religiosas plena
autonomía para el desarrollo de
sus fines propios y, entre otras,
las siguientes facultades:
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Art. 7. By virtue of the
freedom of religion and
worship, it is recognized that
religious entities have full
autonomy for the development
of their own ends and, among
others, the following rights:

(a) Ejercer libremente su
propio ministerio, practicar
el culto, celebrar reuniones
de carácter religioso y
fundar y mantener lugares
para esos fines;

(a) To freely exercise their
own ministry, practice acts
of worship, celebrate
meetings of religious
nature, and found and
maintain facilities for these
ends;

(b) Establecer su propia
organización interna y
jerarquía; capacitar,
nombrar, elegir y designar
en cargos y jerarquías a las
personas que correspondan
y determinar sus
denominaciones, y

(b) To establish their own
internal organization and
hierarchy; to train, appoint,
elect, and designate
individuals to positions and
hierarchies, and to
determine their titles; and
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(c) Enunciar, comunicar y
difundir, de palabra, por
escrito o por cualquier
medio, su propio credo y
manifestar su doctrina.

Capítulo III
Personalidad jurídica y
estatutos
Art. 8°. Las entidades
religiosas podrán crear personas
jurídicas de conformidad con la
legislación vigente. En especial,
podrán:

(c) To declare, communicate,
and express, by word, writing,
or any other means, their own
creed and to manifest their
doctrine.
Chapter III
Juridical Personality and
Bylaws
Art. 8. Religious entities will
be able to create juridical
persons in conformity with
prevailing legislation. In
particular, they may:

(a) Fundar, mantener y
dirigir en forma autónoma
institutos de formación y de
estudios teológicos o
doctrinales, instituciones
educacionales, de
benefiencia o humanitarias,
y

(a) Autonomously found,
maintain, and direct
institutes of formation and
of theological or doctrinal
studies, [and] educational,
charitable, or humanitarian
institutions, and

(b) Crear, participar,
patrocinar y fomentar
asociaciones, corporaciones
y fundaciones, para la
realización de sus fines.

(b) Create, participate in,
sponsor, and develop
associations, corporations,
and foundations for the
realization of their
objectives.

Art. 9°. Las asociaciones,
corporaciones, fundaciones y
otros organismos creados por
una iglesia, confesión o
institución religiosa, que
conforme a sus normas jurídicas
propias gocen de personalidad
jurídica religiosa, son

Art. 9. Those associations,
corporations, foundations, and
other organizations created by
a church, confession, or
religious institution that,
according to their own
juridical norms, enjoy religious
juridical personality, are
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reconocidas como tales.
Acreditará su existencia la
autoridad religiosa que los haya
erigido o instituido. Las
entidades religiosas, así como
las personas jurídicas que ellas
constituyan en conformidad a
esta ley, no podrán tener fines
de lucro.

recognized as such. The
religious authority that created
or instituted them will prove
their existence. Religious
organizations, like the juridical
persons that they establish in
conformity with this law,
cannot be for profit.

Art. 10°. Para constituir
personas jurídicas que se
organicen de conformidad con
esta ley, las entidades religiosas
deberán seguir el
procedimiento que se indica a
continuación:

Art. 10. To establish juridical
persons that are organized in
conformity with this law,
religious entities should follow
the process indicated hereafter:
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(a) Inscripción en el
registro público que llevará
el Ministerio de Justicia de
la escritura pública en que
consten el acta de
constitución y sus estatutos;

(a) Registration in the
public registry, managed
by the Ministry of Justice,
of a notarized document in
which are recorded the
articles of incorporation
and its bylaws;

(b) Transcurso del plazo de
noventa días desde la fecha
de inscripción en el
registro, sin que el
Ministerio de Justicia
hubiere formulado
objeción; o, si habiéndose
deducido objeción, ésta
hubiera sido subsanada por
la entidad religiosa o
rechazada por la justicia, y

(b) Passage of ninety days
since the date of
registration in the public
registry, without the
Ministry of Justice having
formulated an objection;
or, if the there has been an
objection, it has been
repaired by the religious
entity or rejected by the
judiciary; and

(c) Publicación en el Diario
Official de un extracto del

(c) Publication in the
Diario Oficial of an extract
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acta de constitución, que
incluya el número de
registro o inscripción
asignado.

of the articles of
incorporation that includes
the assigned registry or
registration number.

Desde que quede firme la
inscripción en el registro
público, la respectiva entidad
gozará de personalidad jurídica
de derecho público por el solo
ministerio de la ley.

Upon finalizing registration in
the public registry, the
respective entity will enjoy
public law juridical personality
for the ministry of the law.

Art. 11°. El Ministerio de
Justica no podrá denegar el
registro. Sin embargo, dentro
del plazo de noventa días
contado desde la fecha de ese
acto, mediante resolución
fundada, podrá objetar la
constitución si faltare algún
requisito. La entidad religiosa
afectada, dentro del plazo de
sesenta días, contado desde la
notificación de las objeciones,
deberá subsanar los defectos de
constitución o adecuar sus
estatutos a las observaciones
formuladas. De la resolución
que objete la constitución
podrán reclamar los interesados
ante cualquiera de las Cortes de
Apelaciones de la región en que
la entidad religiosa tuviere su
domicilio, seguiendo el
procedimiento y plazos
establecidos para el recurso de
protección.

Art. 11. The Ministry of
Justice will not be able to deny
registration. However, within
the period of ninety days
(counted from the date of
registration), through a
wellfounded decision, the
Ministry will be able to object
to the constitution if it
breaches some requirement.
The affected religious entity,
with a period of sixty days of
notification of the [Ministry’s]
objections, should repair the
defects to the constitution or
make adequate its bylaws to
the [Ministry’s] filed
observations. Interested parties
can appeal the [Ministry’s]
decision objecting to the
constitution before any Court
of Appeals of the region in
which the religious entity is
domiciled, following the
procedure and time period
established for an appeal for
protection.
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Art. 12°. En los estatutos o
normas propias de cada persona
jurídica que se constituya en
conformidad a las disposiciones
de esta ley deberán contenerse
aquellos elementos esenciales
que la caracterizan y los
órganos a través de los cuales
actúa en el ámbito jurídico y
que la representan frente a
terceros.

Art. 12. The bylaws or own
rules of each juridical person
established in conformity with
the requirements of this law
should contain those essential
elements that characterize the
person, and the agencies [or
organs] through which the
person acts in the legal arena
and that represents the person
to third parties.

El acta constitutiva contendrá,
como mínimo, la
individualización de los
constituyentes, el nombre de la
persona jurídica, sus domicilios
y la constancia de haberse
aprobado los estatutos.

The articles of incorporation
will contain, at minimum, an
individualized list of
constituents, the name of the
juridical person, its domiciles,
and records of having
approved the bylaws.

Las personas condenadas por
delito que merezca pena
aflictiva no podrán suscribir el
acta de constitución de la
persona jurídica.

Individuals convicted of a
crime that merits afflictive
punishment cannot sign the
juridical person’s articles of
incorporation.

Art. 13°. Los ministros de
culto de una iglesia, confesión
o institución religiosa
acreditarán su calidad de tales
mediante certificación expedida
por su entidad religiosa, a
través de la respectiva persona
jurídica, y les serán aplicables
las normas de los artículos 360,
N°. 1°.; 361, N°s. 1° y 3°, y
362 del Código de
Procedimiento Civil, así como
lo establecido en el artículo

Art. 13. Ministers of worship
of a church, confession, or
religious institution will prove
their status as such by way of
certification issued through the
respective juridical person of
their religious entity, and to
them will apply, the norms
found in 360(1), 361(1),(3),
and 362 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, and article 201(2)
of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
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201, N°. 2°, del Código de
Procedimiento Penal.
Capítulo IV
Patrimonio y exenciones

Chapter IV
Wealth and Exemptions

Art. 14°. La adquisición,
enajenación y administración de
los bienes necesarios para las
actividades de las personas
jurídicas constituidas conforme
a esta ley estarán sometidas a la
legislación común.

Art. 14. The acquisition,
alienation, and administration
of those assets necessary for the
activities of juridical persons
established in conformity with
this law will be subject to
general legislation.

Sin perjucio de lo anterior, las
normas jurídicas propias de
cada una de ellas forman parte
de los requisitos de validez para
la adquisición, enajenación y
administración de sus bienes.

Without prejudice of the
above, the legal rules of each
juridical person form part of
the enforceability requirements
for the acquisition, alienation,
and administration of its assets.

Art. 15°. Las entidades
religiosas podrán solicitar y
recibir toda clase de donaciones
y contribuciones voluntarias, de
particulares e instituciones
públicas o privadas y organizar
colectas entre sus fieles, para el
culto, la sustentación de sus
ministros u otros fines propios
de su misión.

Art. 15. Religious entities are
able to solicit and receive all
classes of donations and
voluntary contributions from
members of the public, and
public and private institutions,
and to organize collections
from their members, for the
religion, the support of their
ministers, or other purposes of
their mission.

Ni aún en caso de disolución
los bienes de las personas
jurídicas religiosas podrán pasar
a dominio de alguno de sus
integrantes.

Not even in the case of
dissolution will the assets of
religious juridical persons be
able to pass to the possession
of any of its members.
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Art. 16°. Las donaciones que
reciban las personas jurídicas a
que se refiere esta ley, estarán
exentas del trámite de
insinuación, cuando su valor no
exceda de veinticinco unidades
tributarias mensuales.

Art. 16. The donations
received by those juridical
persons referred to by this law
will be exempt from taxation
when the donations’ value
does not exceed monthly tax
units.

Art. 17°. Las personas jurídicas
de entidades religiosas regidas
por esta ley tendrán los mismos
derechos, exenciones y
beneficios tributarios que la
Constitución Política de la
República, las leyes y
reglamentos vigentes otorguen
y reconozcan a otras iglesias,
confesiones e instituciones
religiosas existentes en el país.

Art. 17. The juridical persons
of religious entities governed
by this law will have the same
rights, exemptions, and tax
benefits that the Political
Constitution of the Republic,
the laws, and existing
regulations grant and
recognize to other churches,
confessions, and religious
institutions existing in the
country.

Art. 18°. Las personas jurídicas
religiosas que a la época de su
inscripción en el registro
público, hubieran declarado ser
propietarias de inmuebles u
otros bienes subjetos a registro
público, cuyo dominio aparezca
a nombre de personas natuales
o jurídicas distintas de ellas
podrán, en el plazo de un año
contado desde la constitución,
regularizar la situación usando
los procedimientos de la
legislación común, hasta
obtener la inscripción
correspondiente a su nombre.

Art. 18. Those religious
juridical persons that, at the
time of their inscription in the
public registry, have declared
to be proprietors of real estate
or other assets subject to
public registry that are
registered in the name of
natural or juridical persons
who are distinct from them
will be able to, within one year
of their establishment,
regularize the situation using
the procedures instituted by
general legislation, until they
have obtained the
corresponding registration in
their name.
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Si optaren por la donación,
estarán exentas del trámite de
insinuación.

If the religious juridical
persons choose to donate such
assets or property, they will be
exempt from taxation.

Capítulo V
Disolución

Chapter V
Dissolution

Art. 19°. La disolución de una
persona jurídica constituida
conforme a esta ley podrá
llevarse a cabo de conformidad
con sus estatutos, o en
complimiento de una sentencia
judicial firme, recaída en juicio
incoado a requerimiento del
Consejo de Defensa de Estado,
el que podrá accionar de oficio
o a petición de parte, en los
casos que así corresponda.

Art. 19. The dissolution of a
juridical person established in
conformity with this law can
occur in conformity with the
juridical person’s bylaws, or in
conjunction with a
wellfounded judicial decision
commenced by the
requirement of the Council of
Defense of the State, which
can act on its own or at a
party’s petition in those cases
that correspond to the
Council.

Disuelta la persona jurídica, se
procederá a eliminarla del
registro a que se refiere el
artículo 10°.

Upon dissolution of the
juridical person, it will be
removed from the registry
referred to in Article 10.

Disposición Final

Final Disposition

Art. 20°. El Estado reconoce el
ordenamiento, la personalidad
jurídica, sea ésta de derecho
público o de derecho privado, y
la plena capacidad de goce y
ejercicio de las iglesias,
confesiones e instituciones
religiosas que los tengan a la
fecha de publicación de esta ley,
entidades que mantendrán el

Art. 20. The State recognizes
the law, the juridical
personality (be it of public law
or private law), and the full
capacity of pleasure and
exercise possessed by the
churches, confessions, and
religious institutions at the
date of publication of this law;
these entities will maintain the
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régimen jurídico que les es
propio, sin que ello sea causa
de trato desigual entre dichas
entidades y las que se
constituyan en conformidad a
esta ley.
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juridical regime that belongs to
them, without having it being
the cause of unequal treatment
between such entities and
those that are established in
conformity with this law.

